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From its origin in 1976 with Jensen and Meckling’s Theory of the Firm, based on the agency 
problem, shareholder value maximisation became a corporate mantra, as the primary purpose 
of a company became maximising value for its shareholders. Shareholder value maximisation 
is strongly connected with value creation, with firms creating value for investors, and value 
extraction, with executives generating wealth for themselves. Upon the preliminary research 
of the topic in Finland, various academic sources and the Finnish Limited Liability Company 
Act stated that the primary purpose of a firm is to generate value for its shareholders from a 
long-term perspective, and not for short-term capital gains. 
 
The present thesis forms around the hypothesis that Finnish firms aim at maximising 
shareholder value. It examines data from the 20 largest publicly traded companies in the 
Helsinki Stock Exchange (OMXH) during years 2012-2016 to view how firms seek at 
maximising shareholder value. The indicators looked upon for shareholder value maximisation 
are executive compensation (or CEO pay), shareholdings and stock options, dividends, share 
repurchases or buybacks, and the choice between dividends and share repurchases. The data 
and statistics are then compared with 20 U.S. publicly traded companies with correspondent 
market cap.  
 
Empirical evidence has shown that while executive compensation within both Finnish and 
U.S. companies is strongly related to shareholder value maximisation within CEO variable 
pay (especially with Long-Term Incentives strongly tied to performance), in U.S. there is a 
higher ratio of variable pay if compared to fixed pay, while in Finland base salary represents 
a steady part of executive compensation. A strong dividend policy to maximise shareholder 
value by returning excess cash to shareholders, with an increase of dividends per share over 
time, was encountered in both Finnish and U.S. companies. Stock option plans are still widely 
used in U.S., while results have not shown significant evidence of stock options granted, or 
exercised, by the Finnish executives. While share repurchases are widely used in U.S. to 
return cash to shareholders, Finnish firms did not have a significant amount of share 
repurchases between 2012 and 2016, with dividends being the chosen method to reward 
shareholders and investors.      
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1 Introduction 
 
In a world controlled by the financial markets, which are playing a leading role, instead 
of an intermediary role, altering completely the characteristics of capitalism (quoting 
authors Aglietta and Reberioux, 2005), understanding how the shareholder value and 
the pressure of the financial markets can influence an economy is an ever-contemporary 
topic of discussion and analysis. Shareholder value, shareholder value maximisation or 
shareholder wealth maximisation implies that the ultimate purpose of a firm, and the 
measure of a firm’s success, derives from the extent to which it increases profits for its 
shareholders. The shareholder value management philosophy originated from Jensen 
and Meckling’s article Theory of the Firm in 1976, developed during the 1980s in the 
U.S., and was evangelised, then rejected (Denning 2015) by General Electric’s CEO Jack 
Welch. It can be connected to value creation (for both shareholders and investors) or to 
value extraction. The latter has been subject of heavy criticism when leading to 
shareholder activism, resulting in executives enriching themselves through vast stock 
option programs, and companies focusing on short-term capital gains, or expectation of 
profits rather than actual profits. Risks connected with shareholder value activism have 
led to a new form of corporate malfeasance, to corporate scandals such as Enron and 
Freddie Mac, or stock market crashes such as the dot.com bubble.  
 
Shareholder value has been a topic of my interest during my studies at Metropolia 
Business School since the first academic year. Although it has not been widely discussed 
as our degree program focuses more extensively into logistics and SCM, it has been 
brought to our attention during courses such as Corporate Finance, Finance and electives 
such as Corporate Strategy and Global Political Economy. It was during the latter elective 
course, when discussing the historical context and the economic consequences of the 
liberalization of the financial markets in U.S. and Europe, that I developed the interest 
and the idea of evaluating the shareholder value management philosophy within Finnish 
companies. 
 
The concept of shareholder value was quite recent in Finland and the Nordic countries, 
if compared with U.S. While researching the topic of shareholder value in Finland, I have 
discovered that Finland has not an extensive literature, at least in English language. This 
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is also related to the fact that the financial deregulation and liberalisation in Finland, like 
in Sweden and earlier in Norway, took place only during the 1980s, opening capital 
accounts at the end of the 1980s. A massive over-lending boom followed through the 
1990s, causing asset markets to rise more than consumer prices, and the bust that 
followed caused one of the most devastating economic crisis in the Nordics. During these 
years, the financial markets were reorganized, becoming more equity-financed oriented 
rather than debt-financed, with a recent growth of the stock markets, especially during 
the late 1990s (Hyytinen & Pajarinen 2001). I came across studies discussing the shifting 
of Finland over an Anglo-American corporate governance model, and most importantly, 
that “the purpose of a company is to generate profits for the shareholders, unless 
otherwise provided in the Articles of Association” as stated by section 1:5 of the Finnish 
Limited Liability Company Act. While this has been seen in Finland as a sign of 
shareholder primacy, never the less the purpose of a firm is to generate wealth for its 
shareholders from a long-term perspective, and not for short-term capital gains 
(Mähönen 2013).  
 
Therefore, this thesis forms around the hypothesis that Finnish firms aim at maximising 
shareholder value. Its purpose is to answer the following question: is there any empirical 
evidence that supports the research questions that Finnish companies are aiming at 
maximising shareholder value? If so, how do Finnish firms maximise shareholder value? 
And furthermore, are firms’ management and executives creating value, or extracting 
value for themselves? If so, to what extent? It will conduct a quantitative and qualitative 
analysis of the 20 largest market cap (at least €1 billion euros) Finnish firms listed in the 
OMXH Helsinki Stock Exchange. The indicators of shareholder value maximisation that 
will be discussed through empirical evidence are executive compensation or CEO 
remuneration (including remuneration components or CEO pay mix such as base salary, 
short term incentives, long-term incentives, most importantly, and benefits), 
shareholdings and stock options, dividends, share repurchases or buybacks, and a 
comparison between dividends and share repurchases. The data will range from years 
2012-2016, and it will be compared to U.S. companies with correspondent market cap. 
It will attempt to show comparisons and differences on how Finnish and American firms 
maximise shareholder value through the enounced indicators.  
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Since most Finnish studies, or thesis, are focused on one of the ways companies aim to 
maximise shareholder value, this thesis will attempt to combine with descriptive statistics 
and empirical analysis the aforementioned indicators of shareholder value maximisation 
in a broader manner. Reason why this thesis does not represent only an experiment, but 
furthermore a hopeful reading of interest for students who have not been focusing on 
this particular topic during their academic years.  
2 Literature review: shareholder value history 
2.1 Why are academics still talking about shareholder value? 
 
Vermaelen (2014) defines shareholder value as the present value of future expected 
cash flows over time, from now until infinity. The concept of creating value relies on the 
management’s decisions to generate a Return on Investment (ROI), which if created 
over the long term can increase the share price and pay larger dividends to its 
shareholders (Stillman 2008; Vermaelen 2014). Shareholder value is correlated with the 
concepts of value creation and value extraction: their impact has been discussed 
considerably regarding the U.S. economy. The first one is concerned with the retain-
and-reinvest approach utilized by most U.S. companies from World War II until the late 
1970s. This approach consisted in firms investing their retained earnings to increase the 
company’s capability, reward their employees, increasing their salaries, hiring more 
employees and contributing to a more “sustainable prosperity” (Lazonick 2014). The 
second approach is what drove the U.S. economy towards the downsize-and-distribute 
regime of cost reduction and distributing cash to shareholders, thus extracting value 
rather than creating value through stock based compensation, share repurchases, 
encouraging corporate raiders to target companies, and incentivising companies to 
maximise shareholder value and meeting Wall Street’s expectations for higher quarterly 
Earnings per Share (EPS) (Lazonick 2014). 
 
Shareholder value is commonly held as the raison d’etre of all companies (Vermaelen 
2014). In the United States, this subject has been extensively discussed and it has been 
subject of heavy criticism. The shareholder value maximisation, if leading to a 
shareholder activism focused on short-term financial gains, has been and can be the 
cause of unrealistic expectations, leading to scandals such as Enron or Freddie Mac, 
where companies lied to make corporate earnings appear to rise at a constant rate 
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towards the infinite, reassuring the projections of securities analysts. They cooked the 
books (Enron), or under-reported earnings (Freddie Mac), creating a new form of 
corporate malfeasance in the 1990s (Dobbin & Zorn 2005). By focusing on expectations 
of profits rather than actual profits, firms prefer to look at the next quarter (or “meeting 
the quarterlies”) rather than at a long-term strategy (Brooks 2014; Mizruchi & Kimeldorf 
2005: 213). The economist John Kay states that the most profitable companies are not 
the most profit oriented: “shareholder value is an outcome, not a strategy” (Brooks 
2014).  
 
The concept of maximising shareholder value became a corporate mantra since Jensen 
and Meckling’s article Theory of the Firm in 1976 (Martin 2010). Prior to that, Milton 
Friedman’s article which appeared in the New York Times in 1970 was considered a 
political manifesto to achieve a vision of economic freedom: this vision aimed to combat 
the constrains of the capacity of capitalism by creating a managerial focus that would 
maximize shareholder value (Denning 2014). The shareholder value model developed 
with the 1980s-financial liberalisation, deregulation and freedom of capital markets in 
the United States during the Reagan administration, the weakening of strong labour 
union, regulations and the role of the state – anything that would be an unnecessary 
impediment to economic growth. Regan conducted an assault on labour and state and 
took the step of freeing up markets, implementing fiscal and tax policies to encourage 
investments. This view was at the foundation of neo-liberalism (Mizruchi & Kimeldorf 
2005: 218). 
 
In the United States, the shareholder value maximisation is at the heart of companies’ 
management philosophy. The Theory of the Firm brought into mainstream the agency 
theory, or agency problem, which states that one party (the principal) would engage 
another party (the agent) to perform some services on their behalf, although the agent 
will not always act in the best interest of the principal. The goals of the principal and the 
agent are not always aligned. The agent might take some decisions that might benefit 
long term financial goals, but affect the short-term profitability of the company. The 
principal is not always aware of these decisions, and might instead prefer short term 
capital gains. The article explains this relationship with the principal as the shareholder, 
and the agent as the company (Luoma 2013). 
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The dawn of shareholder value or shareholder movement is also attributed to Jack 
Welch, the former CEO of General Electric (GE) from 1981 until 2001, who has been 
notorious not only for leaving an indelible financial mark on GE history (increased market 
value from $12billion USD to $280 billion USD, 600 acquisitions, shifting into emerging 
markets) but furthermore for his “rank and yank” policies, which became practice of 
other corporations. Most famously, by firing each year the bottom 10% of his managers, 
without taking into account absolute performance, and by rewarding the top 20% with 
bonuses and stock options. Welch became the most important figure of shareholder 
value movement in the 1980s, and owned $900 million USD of GE stock option upon 
stepping out of his CEO position (Denning 2015).  
 
John Kay in a recent 2015 article Shareholders Think They Own the Company – They 
Are Wrong, takes the assumption that shareholders own the corporation and states that 
while they own the shares, this does not give them any right of possession or use. In 
fact, they have no more rights than any other customers to services of the business they 
“own”, while even the right to appoint the board of directors is very theoretical, according 
to Kay. Therefore, to the following question “who owns the company?”, Kay answers 
simply “no one”. This right of ownership is spread over a large number of people, as 
someone can buy or sell shares, someone else can decide how the shares are voted, 
someone else benefits from the company’s returns.  
 
Moltz (1995: 791), states that shareholders do not identify themselves with the 
corporation they own. Most investors owning equity shares nowadays identify their 
ownership in a corporation only as an investment, and this is particularly related to 
companies with many shareholders. The more the volume of the traded stock of a 
company, the more liquid it becomes, and the more it resembles any other investment 
(Moltz 1995: 791). One can argue that an investor does not value the company at all, 
but only the liquidity it provides from its profit expectations and the stock prices.  
 
The main debate lays in the shareholder versus stakeholder approach: people who own 
at least one share versus people who have an interest, claim or stake inside or outside 
an organization. The shareholder approach, which will be discussed on this thesis, is 
seen mostly in the U.S. United Kingdom, as both countries operate under common law. 
The stakeholder value approach, which advocates that the company should rather 
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balance the interest of employees and customers, it is seen mainly in countries that 
operate under civil law, including Germany, France and Japan. There has also been a 
debate whether balancing only the interests of the stakeholders should be the single 
governing objective of a company. It is rather impossible to satisfy the interest of all 
stakeholders, especially the ones external in a company. Stakeholders do not only include 
customers and suppliers, but furthermore governments, taxpayers, unions, community, 
even the natural environment (Jones 2012). Bringing all together the interests of a 
collective group and reach a common agreement is not always possible, therefore 
business decisions must consider each point of view (Mauboussin & Rappaport 2016). 
Finland operates under civil law, like Sweden: however, we will see how shareholders 
have been gaining importance during the past decades. 
  
2.2 The integration of the Nordics financial markets and the Finnish banking crisis 
 
In Finland, together with the other Nordic countries, the financial integration changed 
profoundly the economic landscape. The 1990s banking crisis was a devastating one that 
caused losses in output, employment and industrial production. No event in the entire 
post World War II could compare for similar magnitude; in terms of loss for society, it 
has been compared to the Great Depression of the 1930s. Finland, Norway and Sweden’s 
economy evolved in similar ways during the last decades of the 20th century, and went 
through a period of financial deregulation and liberalization that opened their capital 
accounts at the end of the 1980s. This created a lending boom that channelled credits 
to the asset markets (mainly real estate and stock markets), causing them to rise more 
than consumer prices, and large and unexpected swings in real rate of interest (Jonung 
2008: 564; Jonung, Kiander & Vartia 2009: 310). The financial system expanded in an 
extreme way, causing a massive over-lending, and the growth of asset prices was used 
as a collateral for debt. After the macroeconomic boom, first in the Norwegian and then 
in the Finnish and Swedish economies in 1988-1989, the bust followed, throwing the 
countries into a deep crisis (Jonung 2008: 565). 
  
The stock markets of Finland and Sweden expanded due to the financial integration and 
opening, causing a rapid increase of foreign holdings of domestic stocks (Figure 1) 
(Jonung et al. 2009). This changed profoundly the corporate governance and created a 
higher enforcement in Nordics civic law. The development in corporate governance 
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included, most importantly, a steep reduction on creditor’s rights and a higher level of 
investor’s and shareholder’s protection, on a timeframe between 1980 and 2000. During 
the improvement of the economic environment in the mid-1990s post crisis, the 
development of the stock markets that started in the 1980s continued. Equity issuance 
by the non-financial institution increased, and IPOs (Initial Public Offerings) restarted 
once the economy started improving. Between 1995 and 2000, 55 Finnish companies 
were listed. Stock markets in Finland and Sweden expanded as a result of the financial 
opening and integration, and this integration changed significantly the economic 
landscape of the Nordics (Hyytinen, Kuosa & Takalo 2003).   
 
Figure 1. Financial openness in the Nordic Countries 1970-2004. Total foreign assets plus total 
foreign liabilities to GDP, per cent (Source: Jonung 2009; Philip Lane 2008). 
 
All listed companies in Finland observe the Corporate Governance Code, also referred to 
as “the Code”. This must be applied in accordance with the “comply or explain” principle. 
The company shall comply all recommendations of the code. In case it would depart 
from it, it needs to provide a good reason to do so, and according with the “comply or 
explain” principle, it must report which recommendations it is departing from and why 
the decision was made (Finnish Corporate Governance Code 2015: 10). Many important 
governance matters for publicly listed companies are also regulated by national 
provisions of the Securities Markets Act. Main provisions regard marketing securities, 
duties on publish prospectuses, transparencies, duties on disclosure during general 
meetings, proxy and flagging, takeover bids and the obligation to launch a bid (Mähönen 
2013). The Finnish Corporate Governance Code harmonizes the procedures of the 
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publicly traded and listed companies, regarding both corporate governance and 
remuneration. It takes into account the views of both shareholders and investors with 
increased transparency between the two parties, the ability of both to evaluate the firms’ 
practices, and an overview of what are the acceptable practices of Finnish listed 
companies (Finnish Corporate Governance Code 2015: 9). 
  
The turnover of the Helsinki Stock Exchange grew significantly during the 1990s, 
although this had happened mainly because of Nokia, together with the number of listed 
firms increasing, especially in the late 1990s and 2000. This factor has contributed to 
the prevalence of option schemes (Mäkinen 2007: 35). 
 
The Nordic capital markets have become increasingly integrated. A number of mergers 
across borders have taken place, creating large Pan-Nordic companies, in many cases 
with more than one listing in the stock exchange (i.e. Stora Enso, listed on both the 
Helsinki and Stockholm stock exchange) (Mähönen 2013). The Finnish stock market is 
100% owned by the NASDAQ OMX, which consolidates the Nordic stock markets into 
the NASDAQ Nordic, except for the Oslo stock exchange. As result, listing rules and 
requirements have been currently on the process of harmonizing (Mähönen 2013). As 
mentioned, the foreign ownership of stock-listed companies has increased in the last 
decades, and now it represents over one third of the Nordic region as a whole. The 
Nordic countries have a remarkable number of international companies, which have 
attracted a large foreign ownership. However, the stock market is still relatively small, if 
compared with larger markets – if we consider that the total market cap of the whole 
Nordic Market is about half of the London Stock Exchange Main Market (Mähönen 2013). 
 
Although Finland belongs to the Nordic legal family with features of common law and 
civil law, the traditional Nordic corporate governance has been influenced by the 
European harmonization in company and security law, which has decreased differences 
on corporate governance regulations among European countries (Mähönen 2013). 
Finland did not have fraud cases or scandals minimally comparable to Enron in U.S. or 
Parmalat in Italy. The only scandal registered in Finland concerned a non-listed company, 
the Töölön Travel Agency in 2010, where the Helsinki District Court imposed a sentence 
on the main owner of the bankrupt company for falsifying the books between 1992 and 
2005 and for taking more than €450,000 in dividends. The quality of enforcement is high 
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in Nordic civil law countries, including Finland, especially after the 1990s banking crisis 
(Hyytinen, Kuosa & Takalo 2003; Mähönen 2013). Furthermore, the Finnish media is 
very alerted on economic crime (Mähönen 2013). 
 
In 2005, according to the Federation of European Securities Exchange, foreign investors 
owned about 51% of all shares, 53% according to other sources (Jones et al. 2004: 6), 
although Finnish stock market was opened to foreign investors only since 1992. Today, 
foreigners are the prevalent ownership group.  The concentration of ownership in Finland 
is very much less disperse if compared to U.S.: the Anglo-American corporate 
governance system is primarily based on disperse corporate ownership, with the 
management having control over the corporation, whereas in U.K. a corporation is 
controlled by the board of directors (Jakobsson & Korkeamäki 2015: 233).  
   
In Finland, corporate law provides the Annual General Meeting (AGM) with a considerably 
larger and ultimate power over the corporation, and can replace the board at any time; 
government ownership has also still a very important role within Finnish publicly listed 
companies, among the highest in the Western countries (Jakobsson & Korkeamäki 2015: 
233). The concentration of ownership in Finnish publicly listed traded companies is 
therefore more closely related to the European shareholder ownership model. Foreign 
ownership, according to Mäkinen, seems to be one of the causes of the transformation 
of the Finnish business towards a more open culture where shareholder value and wealth 
has been receiving high priority, as suggested by authors Tainio and Lilija (2003), quoted 
by Jones at al. (2004: 6). As U.S. and UK have a primary role in the financial markets, 
other European countries, including Finland, have been moving towards the Anglo-
American governance system, as explained by Jakobsson and Korkeamäki (2015: 233).  
3 Research question, analytical framework and methodology  
 
During the literature review research for both the preliminary research and the thesis 
plan, I encountered a number of claims that resulted in the formulation of my hypothesis 
or research question, which formed the foundation for this experiment. The claims I 
came across when researching articles and case studies, supported by Mähönen (2013) 
and the Liability Company Act of 2006, were: 
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• Finland has been moving towards the Anglo-American corporate governance 
system.  
• Section 1:5 of the Limited Liability Company Act states that the purpose of a 
company is to generate profits for the shareholders, unless otherwise provided 
in the Articles of Association. 
• Although some Finnish scholars have seen this as a manifestation of shareholder 
primacy, the purpose of the business is to generate wealth for the shareholders 
from a long-term perspective, not by means of a factor of making short term or 
individual decisions. 
 
These claims formed the basis for this experiment, where I formulate the hypothesis and 
the assumption that Finnish firms aim at maximising shareholder value and shareholder 
wealth. Although we have discovered during the literature review that the shareholder 
value concept is much more recent in Finland and the Nordic countries if compared with 
U.S., we will analyse the shareholder value management philosophy in Finland. We will 
compare it then with the American shareholder value maximisation model within 
statistics applied to theoretical framework. By these means, I will illustrate all the main 
indicators of shareholder value maximisation in a number of selected Finnish and 
American listed companies for the years 2012-2016, and support these indicators with 
empirical evidence.  
 
3.1 Sample of studies companies 
 
The 20 companies presented in this thesis that will be researched upon for my 
experiment and investigation will follow the satisfying criteria: 
• Large cap (at least €1 billion euros) 
• Listed in the OMX Helsinki stock exchange (some of the companies will be double 
listed) 
The chosen samples of study companies are illustrated in Table 1, from the largest 
market cap, taken from the Kauppalehti website, on January 2017: 
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Table 1. Top 20 Finnish publicly traded companies by market cap (Source: Kauppalehti).   
 
 
 
Since the nature of this thesis, I will not choose a specific industry to conduct my 
experiment. Therefore, the chosen 20 companies will operate in industries such as 
financial services, technologies, basic materials, healthcare, telecommunications, 
utilities, consumer services and consumer goods. Some of the companies have both A 
and B shares (SSAB, Kesko, Orion), and some have A and R shares (Stora Enso). Most 
of the sample companies have higher trading volumes if compared to the other 
investigated. Furthermore, as some of these companies operate in international markets 
or are registered and headquartered abroad (Nordea, until recent news), I believe they 
disclose and release a relevant amount on information concerning shareholder value 
maximisation.  
3.2 Analytical approach 
 
The most important work within this investigation will rely on seeking for indicators that 
the selected companies are aiming at maximising shareholder value. A claim or a fact is 
Company
Market Cap, 
Million €
Sector
1 Nordea Bank AB 43699 Financial
2 Nokia Oyj 25142 Technology
3 Sampo Oyj 23352 Financial
4 Kone Oyj 22783 Industrials
5 Telia Company AB 16342 Telecommunications
6 Fortum Oyj 13459 Utilities
7 UPM-Kymmene Oyj 12756 Basic Materials
8 Neste Oyj 8661 Oil & Gas 
9 Wärtsilä Oyj Abp 8521 Industrials
10 Stora Enso Oyj 8502 Basic Materials
11 Orion Oyj 6050 Health Care
12 Elisa Oyj 5294 Telecommunications
13 Nokian Renkaat Oyj 4783 Consumer Goods
14 Kesko Oyj 4626 Consumer Services
15 Metso Oyj 4199 Industrials
16 Huhtamäki Oyj 3686 Industrials
17 Outokumpu Oyj 3435 Basic Materials
18 SSAB 3193 Basic Materials
19 Amer Sports Oyj 2994 Consumer Goods
20 Cargotec Oyj 2848 Industrials
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not self-evident. The indicators will be analysed and discussed upon in quantitative 
methods, and within a certain extent, qualitative (what are the company saying on the 
annual reports? How do they say it?). In order to understand shareholder value 
maximisation and thus answer the research question, it is important to analyse its 
components and indicators. The research question “are Finnish firms maximising 
shareholder value?”, and most importantly “how do Finnish firms maximise shareholder 
value?” does not necessarily have a straightforward answer, therefore understanding all 
its components is critical. Reason why the data collection on the following indicators has 
been conducted and results analysed, to show the relationship between the indicators 
and shareholder value or wealth maximisation. 
 
Executive remuneration, CEO compensation or CEO pay is one of the main components 
and most important indicators of shareholder value maximisation. It is the mixture of 
fixed salaries, bonuses, variable pay components such as performance shares or stock 
or call options, disclosed on annual or financial reports, remuneration reports or proxy 
filings (in U.S.). Analysing executive compensation is crucial when discussing shareholder 
value, as there are indisputable links between CEO compensation and shareholder wealth 
maximisation (Murphy 2012). Compensation plans within publicly traded firms are 
designed to align the interests of executives (and the firms) with the ones of the 
shareholders through the use of Long-Term Incentives (LTIs). The purpose of LTIs to 
executives is to offer an equity-based compensation based on holding shares in the 
company. This is referred to as pay for performance.  
 
When a CEO delivers an exceptional performance, the company’s share price increases, 
thus increasing value for shareholders, and the CEO’s variable pay and wealth in form of 
shares increases, thus maximising shareholder value and wealth for executives. Reason 
why, together with total, average and median compensation for the CEO collected during 
the years 2012-2016, data on executive compensation components, most importantly 
Long-Term Incentives (LTIs) is essential as it establishes a powerful link between CEO 
pay and shareholder wealth. The statistics on LTIs aim to show to what extent companies 
tie CEO pay to performance. Executive compensation has been one of the highest 
subjects of criticism on the debate of shareholder value maximisation, as discussed 
during the literature review. 
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Shareholdings and stock options are among the most important indicators of shareholder 
wealth maximisation within executive compensation. Executive compensation in terms 
of shareholder value maximisation needs to be analysed not only in terms of annual 
remuneration or its components, but furthermore from the portfolio of shares, restricted 
stock and stock options (Murphy 2012: 24). Direct stock ownership represents a strong 
link between CEO wealth and shareholder wealth, according to Jensen and Murphy 
(1990). The purpose of the CEO as a large shareholder of a company is to hold shares 
of a company, as the CEO wealth increases when the shares, and therefore the market 
value of the company increases.  
 
Stock option programs give the right, but not the obligation, to buy or sell a security or 
an asset at an established price, called exercise or strike price, within a specified time 
called maturity (Tupala 2006: 10). Stock-based pay is a big component of executive 
compensation and shareholder value maximisation. Options can motivate employees to 
work harder to produce higher returns for the company, and if the company generates 
higher earnings, employees can exercise their options at higher stock prices, thus 
maximising shareholder wealth (Lazonick 2014). The growth of stock options as 
compensation method has generated public discussion, as some view it as a way for top 
executives to transfer excess wealth to themselves (Mäkinen 2007: 74). The data 
collected on CEO’s shareholdings and exercised stock options between 2012 and 2016 
intends to illustrate how the CEO wealth as shareholder is strongly correlated to the 
aggregated value of shareholdings (and the increase or decreases of shareholdings’ 
market value over time using annual closing prices) and the wealth accumulated by the 
use of stock options. Stock options can be correlated to executives extracting value for 
themselves as shareholders, especially when exercising an option at an exercise price 
considerably lower than the share price.  
 
Dividend payments is one of the two main ways a company rewards its shareholders 
within a publicly traded company’s pay-out policy. Usually paid after-tax profits, they are 
a share of a profit that a company will pay at regular intervals (Picardo 2015). In Finland, 
usually dividends are paid once per year, unlike in U.S. where they are paid quarterly. 
The reason for collecting data on dividends relies severely on the research question: as 
the primary purpose of a company is to maximise shareholder value, the profit derived 
from dividend payments compensates the risk that investors undertake when deciding 
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upon investing in a certain firm (Brealey, Myers & Allen 2011). A company aiming at 
maximizing shareholder value through a stable dividend policy will most certainly 
increase dividends per share over time, to reward its shareholders. With dividends, firms 
maximise shareholder wealth, while investors maximise utility, according to Allen & 
Michaely (2004). The data collected on dividends between 2012 and 2016 will be looking 
at trends regarding dividends paid over the years, percentage of dividends paid over 
total net profits and most importantly increase of dividends per share during the analysed 
years, to tell us to what extent companies have been maximising shareholder value by 
returning excess cash to shareholders.   
 
Stock repurchases/buybacks is the other main way to reward shareholders. Share 
repurchases are a very important indicator of shareholder value maximisation: among 
the biggest benefits, is that they will reduce the amount of outstanding shares in the 
market, which can increase the profitability of earnings per share (EPS), and improve 
performances such as Return on Equity (ROE) (Picardo 2015). This will most likely 
increase the share price over time, as companies can use share repurchases when they 
believe their stock is undervalued. Although this is not always the case, it is usually the 
reason why firms perform share repurchases. By increasing EPS and share price over 
time, firms maximise value and wealth for their shareholders. Therefore, the data 
collected on total share repurchases between 2012-2016 aims to show to what extent 
firms have chosen to maximise shareholder value with the use of share repurchases, and 
the possible reasons behind them. Firms do not necessarily communicate to shareholders 
the real reasons behind share repurchases, therefore we can make only theoretical 
assumptions during the empirical analysis, of why the firms use share repurchases to 
maximise shareholder value. Buybacks can be often pro-cyclical (companies use 
buybacks when they are holding cash), and within the U.S., are more often financed 
with debt and can be unannounced. In Finland, we will discover how buybacks are 
announced at the Annual General Meeting (AGM), and how companies are obliged to 
publish buybacks on daily basis.  
 
The last indicator looked upon will be the choice between dividends and share 
repurchases, as they can form a significant combination that can boost shareholder 
returns. However, which one is better? This has been a subject of debate from the 
academics of the field. Depending on what the shareholder time horizon is, buybacks 
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are believed to have a short-term impact, while a longer-term advantage relies on 
dividend payments (Ritholtz 2015). The data collected on the 20 companies between 
2012-2016 looks upon the comparison of which one of the two methods Finnish firms 
use to maximise shareholder value, whether it is done through dividends, share 
repurchases, or the combination of the two.  
 
While discussing and analysing the main indicators of shareholder value maximisation, 
the following notions will be furthermore taken into consideration: 
 
• Financial goals 
• Profitability 
• Share price 
• Reported pay and realized pay 
• Earnings per Share (EPS) 
• Return on Equity (ROE) 
 
We will evaluate which are the strongest indicators of shareholder value maximisation in 
Finland. We will comprehend if the evidence of the quantitative and (to a lesser extent) 
qualitative analysis within this thesis supports the research question or hypothesis, or 
whether it departs from the claim that Finnish firms’ ultimate purpose is to maximise 
shareholder value.  
 
When discussing shareholder value maximisation, there is a series of traditional 
accounting measures used by investors and analysts which can measure if a company 
is creating shareholder value for its investors. As shareholder value is strongly connected 
with financial performance, some of the most traditional accounting metrics to measure 
shareholder value are (mentioned above) Earnings Per Share (EPS) and Return on 
Equity (ROE). While these measures do not answer directly the research question, they 
are never the less important to understand the shareholder value maximisation 
philosophy, therefore they will be presented within an appendix when discussing share 
repurchases. Rather than looking for whole trends, we will look how average EPS and 
ROE by sector among the Finnish companies during 2012-2016 relates to shareholder 
value maximisation. Not all companies are presented, as some sectors had not sufficient 
companies within for a comparison, for instance consumer services (Kesko), oil and gas 
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(Neste), or sectors with only two companies offering no comparison 
(telecommunications, services).  
The present thesis will offer furthermore a comparison with other studies, descriptive 
statistics and dissertations on the subject, with focus on executive compensation, stock 
options and share repurchases. The case studies will be collected largely from Finnish 
and U.S. authors, which were of absolute importance during the writing of this thesis. 
 
3.3 Benchmarking/comparison with the U.S. shareholder value maximisation 
 
As I have encountered during the preliminary literature research that Finland has been 
moving towards an Anglo-American corporate governance system, and that Finland has 
opened to financial liberalization more reliant on equity financing rather than debt 
financing, the data will be then compared/benchmarked with U.S. companies with 
correspondent market cap. After all, the shareholder value theory originated in the U.S., 
reason why a comparison with the American shareholder value maximisation seems 
more relevant than with another Nordic or European countries. The U.S. companies’ data 
has been collected from a S&P 500 database available on SlickCharts and researched 
from the MarketWatch website, which contains a large database of companies listed on 
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), NASDAQ and Dow Jones. It is important to note 
that large market cap Finnish companies in U.S. would be considered mid-cap, 
considering the different level of market capitalization and the size of the stock market 
– as we have mentioned during the literature review on page 8. For instance, while in 
Finland a large cap listed company is considered at least €1 billion euros, in U.S. a small-
cap company varies between $300 million and $2 billion USD.  
 
By any means, while the 20 sample Finnish companies have been listed in order from 
the largest (Nordea) to the 20th largest (Cargotec), the top 20 U.S. market cap company 
within the S&P 500 would range from Apple with $790 Billion USD (€686 Billion) market 
cap, to Citigroup Inc with $181 Billion (€157 Billion). Therefore, seventeen of the 20 
companies belong to the S&P 500 list, while the remaining three have been sourced from 
MarketWatch due to the inability to find a low correspondent market on the S&P 500 list 
cap for SSAB, Amer Sports and Cargotec (between €3.2 and €2.8 billion euros). Never 
the less, the market cap of the 20 U.S. companies have been sourced according to 
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corresponding market cap, thus creating a very balanced comparison (Table 2). Apart 
from Proofpoint, listed on NASDAQ, all the other companies are listed on the NYSE. 
 
Table 2. U.S. Publicly traded companies with correspondent market cap in $USD (Source: 
SlickCharts). 
   
 
 
This thesis is focused on indicators within shareholder value maximisation, not on stock 
market returns, therefore not having all 20 companies listed on the S&P 500 does not 
represent an impediment within the thesis’ scope or the quantitative analysis. The thesis 
will attempt to provide a clear comparison across all the enunciated indicators of 
shareholder value maximisation between Finland and U.S. However, it is important to 
remember that the scope and research question of the thesis is not a mere comparison 
between two models. The empirical evidence aims to answer the research question on 
how Finnish firms are aiming at maximizing shareholder value, what is the approach they 
use to maximise shareholder wealth and to return excess cash to their shareholders (is 
it through dividends or share repurchases) and if there is any evidence that supports the 
Company
Market Cap, 
Million $
Sector
1 Prudential Financial Inc 484200 Financial
2 Fidelity National Information Services Inc 28544 Technology
3 Hewlett Packard 27770 Technology
4 Delphi Automotive 24800 Consumer Goods
5 WEC Energy Group Inc 19950 Utilities
6 Mettler-Toledo International Inc 15640 Health Care
7 HCP Inc 15090 Financial
8 Xylem Inc 6680 Industrials Good
9 Pinnacle West Capital Corp 9620 Utilities
10 Marathon Oil Corp 9530 Basic Materials
11 Apartment Investment & Management Co 6810 Financial
12 Assurant Inc 5840 Financial
13 Michael Kors Holdings Ltd 5360 Consumer Goods
14 Newfield Exploration Co 5170 Basic Materials
15 FLIR Systems, Inc 4610 Technology
16 Chesapeake Energy Corp 4420 Basic Materials
17 AutoNation Inc 4290 Services
18 Proofpoint Inc 3760 Technology
19 Tribune Media 3600 Services
20 Dana Inc 3470 Consumer Goods
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claim that Finland has been moving towards an Anglo-American corporate governance 
and shareholder value model.    
 
3.4 Sources of data collection for empirical evidence 
 
The financial data for the 20 Finnish sample companies was researched upon and 
analysed based on the last five years’ annual reports, financial statements, remuneration 
reports, for years 2012-2016. The reports included everything from financial data, to 
corporate governance statements, to investor relations announcements. Most of the data 
is also available on the companies’ website under the sections corporate governance, 
corporate governance reports, remuneration reports, or annual or financial reports. A 
total of 100 annual reports/financial reports, plus 100 remuneration reports (when 
available) were looked into for data collection of executive compensation, shareholdings 
and stock options. Dividends and share repurchases data has been collected from both 
financial reports and investor relations sections on the companies’ websites.  
 
 U.S. data on executive compensation, and its components such as stock and option 
awards has been collected from the 20 companies’ annual proxy statements (or proxy 
filings, or Schedules 14A), which are requested by the United States Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC), and are widely available on the companies’ website 
sections investor relations under SEC Filings, and on websites such as sec.gov and 
seekingalpha.com. Data such as dividends paid, dividends per share and share 
repurchases has been collected from the Morningstar website.   
 
3.5 Methods used to store and analyse data 
 
Excel was used for all the data storing and data collection, to create databases, tables 
and charts based on the analysed indicators, to run totals, averages (means), and 
medians. Most of the Excel tables, when seeking for indicators such as total executive 
compensation, total dividends paid, total share repurchases, are composed of 100 
observations per table analysis (20 companies per 5 years).  The table presented on 
Appendix 1 can give an example.  
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3.6 Thesis limitations  
 
While covering a very broad subject such as shareholder value maximisation, this thesis 
has its limitations. As previously explained, the research question does not necessarily 
have a straightforward answer: looking at how firms maximise shareholder value is not 
a simple task to conduct and at times can leave with further questions, rather than merely 
conclusive answers. While the thesis wants to fully assesses the research question, it is 
important to remind that there is no absolute answer within shareholder value 
maximisation and its indicators. Many studies and analysts (Murphy and Conyon, Jensen 
and Murphy, Stern Stewart & Co) have often debated on the most prominent and relevant 
methods. There is not a perfect metric, or a universal one, to measure shareholder value 
maximisation (Leahy 2000). The concept of shareholder value was originated in 1976; 
since the Theory of the Firm, an immense amount of theoretical framework and case 
studies on shareholder value maximisation has been written, and several will be 
presented on this thesis to discuss indicators of shareholder value maximisation. Some 
analysts focus on dividends, some on stock option plans, some “fixates” on share 
repurchases (according to McKinsey, 2006) or “massively” on Earnings per Share (EPS) 
(Stewart, cited in De Wet 2014). “There is no silver bullet; each of these metrics is flawed 
somewhat”, according to Jim McTaggart, value-based management pioneer and former 
Wells Fargo’s vice president (Leahy 2000). Some of the traditional metrics have been 
often disputed as ineffective, depending on the sector (See Appendix 2). 
 
Limitations have also been encountered when coming into conclusions when explaining 
differences between Finnish and U.S. companies within shareholder value indicators: for 
instance, why a company has been using stock option plans for CEOs or executives, or 
the reason why certain companies have gone through share repurchases programs. We 
can only make assumptions based on current observations during this thesis, theoretical 
framework connected to empirical data analysed for the years 2012-2016, for both 
Finland and the U.S. Furthermore, it is rather impossible to read front-to-back every 
single annual report, financial statement, corporate governance report, proxy filing or 
investor relations web page, together with analysing all share price data, stock returns, 
share issues (to measure the ratio between issued shares, outstanding shares and share 
repurchased), or exercised and sold options or shares (to see to what extent CEO wealth 
has been increasing), due to time, space constraints, and most importantly, availability 
of tools and resources. 
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Data collection, especially for Finnish companies, has been a long and at times difficult 
process, which required a considerable amount of time to be completed. There was not 
the possibility of using DataStream, Reuters, Bloomberg or other paid sources of data, 
usually available to financial institutions, or university portals containing this type of data. 
Researching data for U.S. companies has been a more at ease process, as websites such 
as Morningstar, Bloomberg and Reuters provide a variety of data such as executive 
compensation in all its components (such as share awards and restricted shares), share 
repurchases, dividends paid, shareholdings from CEO and executive management, and 
importantly, stock options exercised. 
 
Therefore, when researching and collecting data, the question of how Finnish firms 
communicate to various shareholders/investors raised the following concern: while 
investors/shareholders demand accessibility of information in a quick manner, an 
investor needs to go into an array of financial statements, annual reports, remuneration 
reports and the investor relations in the website when researching information regarding 
executive compensation, especially vested stock and exercised stock options. In 
comparison, U.S. firms, as mandated by the SEC, are required to compile the proxy 
filings, in which information regarding executive compensation is categorized in a more 
linear way. For instance, the summary compensation table provided in the proxy filings 
provides a clear, concise account of exercised options and vested stocks and change in 
shareholdings, among others.  
 
Furthermore, and most importantly, most listed U.S. companies provide only reported 
(or target) pay, not realized pay. While reported pay is what the CEO is granted during 
the fiscal year (as mandated by the SEC), but not what is necessarely earned, realized 
pay is what the CEO actually earns. According to an Equilar report (2016), only 13.7% 
of publicly traded companies in U.S. disclose both reported and realized pay. For 
instance, the value of stock awards are based on grant date fair values: never the less, 
stock awards have a value upon grant (Murphy 2012: 7). Therefore, when measuring 
executive compensation between the Finnish and U.S. publicly traded companies, this 
represented a limitation when comparing annual compensation, especially in terms of 
Long Term Incentives. While Finnish companies’ annual and financial reports disclosed 
realized pay, U.S. companies disclosed, within the summary compensation tables, only 
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reported pay. When compensation is measured using grant-date values, Murphy (2012), 
calls it “grant-date” vs. “realized” pay.   
4 Empirical analysis results: executive compensation, dividends, share 
repurchases, choice between dividends and share repurchases 
 
4.1 Executive or CEO compensation  
4.2 Theoretical framework 
 
In order to understand how executive compensation relates, as one of the main 
indicators, to how firms maximise shareholder value and wealth, and the relationship 
between CEO pay, CEO wealth and shareholder wealth, it is important to explain 
executive compensation and its components first within its theoretical framework and 
thereafter within empirical evidence. Executive remuneration (or executive pay, or CEO 
compensation) is a complex and controversial subject. For several years, large attention 
from both the media and policymakers, but also academics, have emphasised the high 
level of pay awarded to U.S. executives, and probed if they are consistent with 
shareholders’ interests (Conyon 2006: 25).  
 
The standard economic theory of executive compensation is the principal-agent model 
(Conyon 2006: 25; Murphy 2012: 38). Deeply rooted, as most researches have shown, 
into agency theory, compensations plans are designed to align the interests of risk 
adverse self-interest CEOs with the ones of the shareholders (Murphy 2012: 24). The 
agency theory was largely responsible in the shifting of cash-based payments towards 
payments that rely predominantly on equity, linking payments closely to stock 
performance (Bower & Paine 2017). In the agency model, the shareholder decides upon 
the pay; in reality, the compensation committee of the board of directors decides on the 
pay on behalf of the shareholders. The principal (the shareholders), make an offer based 
on a contract to a CEO (agent). Shareholders motivate the CEO to maximise firm value, 
according to the contract approach to executive pay (Conyon 2006: 25). Therefore, most 
researches are focused in the relationship between the CEO compensation and the value 
of the firm (Murphy 2012).   
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Executive compensation has been for years closely related to the concept of chief 
executives extracting as much value for themselves, taking money from shareholders. 
Within shareholder value maximisation, this can be related to value extraction, rather 
than value creation. Especially when the money is meant for departing executives, this 
is clearly a zero-sum interaction (M.S. 2010). This is often referred to as “hoover up”. A 
part of human behaviour is involved into hoover up resources as Kevin Drum puts it: a 
sales representative maxing out its expense accounts, or the use of political links to 
secure tax reliefs, subsidies, or the exploitation of natural resources (M.S. 2010). The 
Economist did an investigation back in 2007, when the financial crisis was about to break 
in, to illustrate the evidence of the increase ratio of executive compensation compared 
to median earnings, a ratio that has been peaking in the turn of the millennium, as 
shown in Figure 2 (Carr 2007). 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Executive pay relative to average wages in the U.S. (Source: The Economist 2010). 
 
The Corporate Library, an American corporate-governance consultancy, identified 11 
large companies in 2006 (large but poorly governed), including AT&T, Merck and Time 
Warner, where the chief executive had been paid at least $15 million a year for two 
consecutive years, although the company’s shares had been underperforming. Home 
Depot’s CEO Robert Nardelli had received $210 million USD pay-off when he was laid 
off, despite the company’s shares had been falling during the six years’ time he was in 
charge of the company (Carr 2007). 
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Executives receive their pay in various forms, and discussing and analysing them is 
critical, in order to understand executive compensation within shareholder value 
maximisation. The determinants and components of executive compensation can be 
categorized as follows: 
    
• Fixed or base salary 
• Short-term incentives (STIs) 
• Long-term incentives (LTIs) 
• Benefits (i.e. retirement pension) 
 
STIs are also referred to as annual incentives, moreover referred to as performance 
bonuses: they are meant to compensate executives for achieving the firm’s short-term 
goals. LTIs comprise, for instance in the median pay of the S&P 500, the largest 
component of executive pay, usually over 60%, according to the Center on Executive 
Compensation (2017). The scope of LTIs is to reward executives for achievements of 
the company’s goals and objectives that aim at maximising shareholder value, according 
to the Center.  
 
LTIs’ earning opportunities are based on the company’s financial performance and share 
price development, and are subject of approval from the Board of Directors. Programs 
include usually share based incentive plans, restricted share plans and stock options. 
Most of the equity-based compensations are measured on performance over a number 
of years (in Finland, the majority of plans have a length of 3 years). They focus on the 
long-term goals of the company, and are designed to improve employees’ long-term 
performance and maximise shareholders’ value. CEOs usually do not receive any pay 
until the end of the performance period (Center of Executive Compensation 2017; EY 
2016). Employees must fulfil the requirements on their contribution to shareholder value 
increase. LTIs are therefore, and this will be evidenced during the empirical analysis, 
one of the most powerful links between executive compensation, shareholder wealth 
and shareholder value maximisation. LTIs goals can vary from company to company, 
however they are mostly focused on Total Shareholder Return (TSR), Earnings per Share 
(EPS) and other return measures. LTIs, alike STIs (or annual incentives), can encourage 
executives to deliver superior performance (Center on Executive Compensation 2017). 
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During the empirical evidence, we will pay special attention to this component when 
analysing executive compensation within the 20 Finnish and U.S. sample companies.  
 
In U.S., any firm whose securities are registered under Section 12 of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 is required by the U.S. Security Exchange Commission (SEC) to 
file a proxy statement, also known as a Form DEF 14A or Definitive Proxy Statement, 
that is soliciting shareholder votes. There is a series of information required in the 
statements a company is required to file with the SEC before soliciting shareholder vote 
(U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 2011). Information that needs to be filled 
regarding executive compensation or CEO pay that is important for shareholders and 
investors includes a summary compensation table, exercised options and vested stocks.  
 
An important distinction within CEO compensation needs to be understood, when dealing 
with executive pay in the U.S.: the difference between reported pay and realized pay, 
which has been already mentioned within the thesis limitations on the methodology 
section. Realized pay includes compensation that the CEO or executive has actually 
gained, or “harvested value from”; for instance, exercised stock options or sold 
performance shares. This can include also exercising stock options that may have been 
granted to the executive by the company years prior to the stock exercise. Reported pay 
is the first part of the remuneration lifecycle, comprising what is granted, but not earned, 
during the fiscal year (Equilar 2016). Realizable pay is at the middle at the compensation 
lifecycle, focusing at what the executive could earn (after grant, but before stocks or 
options have been vested or exercised), depending how the company will perform in 
accordance with shareholders’ interest, or how the company’s shares will perform in the 
market (ISS Corporate Services 2013). Reason why measuring executive pay can 
represent a difficult task and at time very confusing, according to Murphy (2012), among 
others.   
  
In April 2015, the SEC proposed an amendment called pay vs performance mandated by 
Section 953 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act to 
include both the summary compensation table (reported or target pay) and the realized 
pay, which the SEC defines as actual pay (Equilar 2016; Security and Exchange 
Commission 2015). According to an Equilar report called 2016 Compensation and 
Governance Outlook, S&P 500 companies disclosing realized pay or actual pay in their 
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proxy filings increased from 1.7% in 2011, to 13.7% in 2015 (Equilar 2016). In Finland, 
the Securities Market Association demands all companies to publish a remuneration 
statement in accordance with the Finnish Corporate Governance Code (Securities Market 
Association 2011). Compensation earned for the year is furthermore disclosed within the 
companies’ annual or financial reports.     
 
Mäkinen (2007), on CEO Compensation, Firm Size and Firm Performance, has found out 
how CEO average compensation in Finland has increased from 1996 to 2002. The ratio 
between an average worker and a CEO is higher in U.S. than in Finland. As executive 
pay is considered to have a large impact on the company’s performance and the overall 
economy, in Finland more and more regulations have been put into place regarding 
executive compensation. One of the many regulations affecting executive pay is, for 
instance, the already mentioned Finnish Corporate Governance Code, the multiple 
directives for remuneration within the financial sector, and the European Commission 
proposal for the Shareholders’ Rights Directive. Regulations are targeting to increase 
transparency by requesting better disclosure of executive compensation (EY 2016: 5).  
 
Regarding communicating remuneration statements to shareholders, there is a strict set 
of rules in place in Finland: all companies, according to the Finnish Governance Code, 
must follow a series of recommendations regarding remuneration. These include: 
remuneration committee (Recommendation 17), decision making relating to 
remuneration (Recommendation 22), remuneration and shareholdings of the Board of 
Directors (Recommendation 23), structure of the remuneration (Recommendation 24), 
and directives regarding the remuneration reporting, which includes decision making 
procedure concerning the remuneration, main principles and remuneration reporting 
(Finnish Corporate Governance Code 2015). 
 
4.3 Measuring executive pay within shareholder value maximisation 
 
But thereafter, how do we measure executive compensation when discussing 
shareholder value maximisation? Measuring and evaluating CEO compensation can be a 
quite difficult task for investors: we will highlight some of the most common ways to 
evaluate executive compensation.  
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Pay versus performance (or pay for performance) is one of the most popular ways to 
evaluate CEO compensation. Long-term incentives (LTIs) programmes within 
compensation are directly correlated to stock performance, which creates a close 
relationship between stock performance, CEO compensation and shareholder wealth. It 
is one of the most effective ways to determine if the executives are being overpaid. The 
most common used metric is comparing the change year after year in a stock price. If 
the change in the stock price outpaces the change in pay, then the executive is not 
overpaid (Kuepper 2017).   
 
Peer comparison is another common way utilized to evaluate executive compensation, 
as it compares executive pay with the one of the same industry’s peers. Market leaders’ 
CEOs are commonly paid more than their counterparts within their industries, whereas 
the majority of executives’ pay should be balanced with the one of their peers (Kuepper 
2017).  
 
Murphy (2012: 24) denotes the importance of the relationship between CEO and 
shareholder wealth based not from the current compensation, but from the CEOs’ 
portfolio of stocks, restricted stocks, and stock options. According to Murphy, if 
executives would be paid simply on a base salary set at the commencement of each 
year, it would be rather easy comparing the salaries of executives identifying the highest 
pay, and to review among salaries across the years how the pay has been changing over 
time. For instance, to analyse what is the difference on salaries between executives and 
other employees paid in other occupations.  
 
Jensen and Murphy (1990), in their Harvard Business Review article CEO Incentives – 
It’s Not How Much You Pay, But How, denote how while the public focuses on “excessive 
pay”, the biggest issue relies on how the CEOs are being paid, in order to find a link 
between executive compensation and shareholder wealth. While dismissing pay for 
performance, they claim direct stock ownership and the percentage of the company’s 
outstanding shares the CEO owns as the most powerful link between shareholder wealth 
and executive wealth. If a CEO controls a significant amount of shares, an increase in 
the market value can have a significant feedback effect. 
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As far as pay for performance and peer comparison are very important metrics, this 
thesis is focused on finding empirical evidence if Finnish firms are maximising 
shareholder value, and to compare descriptive statistics of 20 Finnish publicly traded 
companies with 20 U.S. publicly traded firms. Therefore, I will not focus on peer 
comparison (by industry) as it is not relevant to answer the research question.  Pay for 
performance has been previously examined by a large amount of studies, together with 
the ones researched by the student and written by Mäkinen (2007), Murphy (2012), 
among others, who have extensively examined the correlation between CEO pay and 
CEO performance. Never the less, we will view within the empirical data to what extent 
the CEO pay is tied to performance with the use of Long-Term Incentives, the component 
of variable pay that represents the strongest link between CEO compensation and 
shareholder value maximisation. Furthermore, we will explore within the quantitative 
analysis the balance between fixed and variable pay in annual compensation.  
 
As explained during the methodology chapter, to understand CEO pay and its relationship 
with shareholder value maximisation fully, it is crucial to focus on the aggregate amount 
of shares, restricted stock, and stock options that the CEO owns in a company. 
Therefore, following Jensen and Murphy’s argument, when analysing executive pay, 
together with annual compensation and its components, we will pay special attention to 
direct stock ownership and stock options to evaluate how Finnish firms aim at maximising 
shareholder value. We will look at the relation between CEO wealth and shareholder 
wealth, and to what extent CEOs are generating value for themselves.  
  
4.4 Empirical analysis: evidence from Finland and U.S. 
4.4.1 Executive compensation trends and components 2012-2016, Finland and U.S. 
 
While showing with descriptive statistics the CEO pay within the 20 Finnish and U.S. 
firms to view trends over time during 2012-2016 in executive compensation, we are 
looking at the relationship between CEO pay and shareholder value maximisation: 
therefore, as explained during the methodology section, the comparison between 
executive compensation’s components and the relationship between fixed and variable 
pay represents how firms maximise shareholder value through CEO pay. Within variable 
pay, Long-Term Incentives (LTIs) are the most important indicators of shareholder value 
maximisation. 
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When looking at the 20 sample Finnish firms, we can notice an increase in total executive 
compensation during 2012 and 2016 (Figure 3). The total compensation considers all 
the components of executive compensation: base salary, short term incentives (STI), 
long term incentives (LTI) and pensions and benefits, which will be analysed later in this 
chapter. Total executive compensation for the 20 Finnish companies amounted to €245.6 
million euros during the five years’ time.  
 
 
 
Figure 3. Total executive compensation for the 20 Finnish sample companies in 2012-2016. 
 
The sudden increase of executive compensation of 2014 (Figure 3 and 4) is explained 
by a larger than expected pay off in Nokia of €25 million euros (as reviewed in Nokia’s 
financial statement of 2014 and listed as other compensation), when Stephen Elop 
stepped out as the company’s CEO after Microsoft’s €5,44 billion euros buyout of Nokia’s 
mobile phone business. This received much criticism, as under Elop’s three year’s tenure, 
Nokia’s market value fell from €17 billion euros to €11 billion euros (Milne 2014).  
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Figure 4. Executive compensation per company for the 20 Finnish companies, 2012-2016. 
 
Average executive compensation has increased between 2012 and 2016 (Figure 3). 
Average executive compensation rose from €1,6 million in 2012 to €2million euros in 
2013, €3,3 million euros in 2014 (due to Nokia’s former CEO Steve Elop), €2,3 million 
euros in 2015 and €2,8 million euros in 2016. Median compensation increased from 2012 
to 2016 by 78%: it has grown by 22.7% between 2012 and 2013, and by 29% between 
2014 and 2015. In the years between 2013-2014 and 2015-2016, median increase has 
been lower at respectively 6,5% and 5,1% (Figure 5). A full table of total executive 
compensation for the 20 Finnish firms can be found on Appendix 3, section 1. 
 
Table 3. Total, average, median and growth % in executive compensation for the 20 Finnish 
firms, 2012-2016. 
 
 
TOT 56,182,960€      46,225,925€     66,996,853€          43,710,187€     32,492,441€   
Year 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012
AVG 2,809,148€         2,311,296€        3,349,843€             2,185,509€       1,624,622€      
Median 2,154,465€         2,049,830€        1,584,778€             1,487,900€       1,212,287€      
Growth % 21.54% -31.00% 53.28% 34.52%
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Figure 5.  Average and median values for the 20 Finnish sample companies, 2012-2016. 
 
When comparing executive pay between Finland and U.S., various sources have 
evidenced that average CEO compensation in U.S. is $13.8 million USD per year (€11.6 
million euros) for large-cap companies, according to Glassdoor. According to Stanford 
Business (2016), median CEO pay for $21 billion USD market cap firms is $10,6 million 
USD (€9.3 million euros). The comparison with executive pay data from the 20 U.S. 
companies between years 2012-2016, collected from companies’, SEC filings, can show 
a significant difference in total CEO pay (Figure 6). Total executive compensation within 
the 20 U.S. companies amounted to a total of €861 million euros ($1 billion USD). 
Average and median CEO compensation in Finland and U.S. during 2012-2016 differed 
significantly, with respectively €2.4 and €1.4 million euros for the 20 Finnish companies, 
and €8.6 and €7.7 million euros ($10.2 and $9.1 USD) for the 20 U.S. companies (Figure 
7). 
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Figure 6. Total executive compensation for the 20 Finnish and U.S. companies, 2012-2016. 
 
It is important to remind that when analysing executive compensation within the 20 U.S. 
companies, a review of the proxy filings has evidenced the fact (as mentioned within the 
thesis limitations) that most of the companies were only disclosing reported pay, 
therefore the pay that is actually realized (actual pay) especially regarding long-term 
incentives components, (therefore, stock and option awards), might not reflect the actual 
performance of the CEO. A full table of total executive compensation for the 20 U.S. 
companies can been found on Appendix 3, section 2.   
 
 
Figure 7. Average and median values for the 20 Finnish and U.S. companies, 2012-2016. 
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As previously explained, executive compensation components can tell us whether a 
company is seeking to maximise shareholder value with the mix of fixed and variable 
pay, most importantly, with the use of Long Term Incentives that correlate CEO pay to 
performance and to shareholder wealth. Regarding the components of executive pay in 
Finland, figure 8 shows the total compensation among the 20 Finnish firms by 
components of executive compensation, otherwise defined as executive pay mix: base 
salary, short-term incentives (STIs), long-term incentives (LTIs), and pension and 
benefits. In order to represent fairer values of executive compensation’s components, 
the €25 million euros benefits paid to Nokia’s CEO Elop in 2014 has not been accounted 
for.  
 
Statistics suggest that while LTIs are the essential component of CEO pay within 
shareholder value maximisation, base salary within the 20 Finnish companies represents 
never the less a steady component of CEO pay. Therefore, when considering shareholder 
wealth, variable pay does not outpace fixed pay in the Finnish firms, which seems to 
suggest that while in U.S., as we will see, variable pay plays a higher role within 
shareholder value maximisation, in Finland this trend within CEO pay is more inclined 
towards a stable combination of fixed and variable pay.  
 
 
 
Figure 8. Executive compensation components or CEO pay mix for the 20 Finnish companies, 
2012-2016.  
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Later in the empirical analysis, we will view in what forms of equity rewards the LTIs 
come when analysing the 20 Finnish firms. For instance, in 2016 Nokia paid only 11% 
of base salary within total compensation, while 79% of pay was in form of LTIs. In 2015, 
84% of total compensation was based on at-risk pay tied to performance (Nokia 2015). 
Within the 20 Finnish firms Nokia was the company with the higher percentage of 
variable salary. The statistics and empirical evidence suggests that Long Term Incentives 
(LTIs) have decreased between 2012 and 2013, and then increased between 2015 and 
2016. LTIs percentage growth has more than doubled between 2013 and 2016, which 
reflects the actual payments attributable of the vesting of share incentive plans. Median 
base salary decreased by 10% between 2012 and 2013, then increased by 16% between 
2013 and 2014. 2015 and 2016 showed respectively a decrease of 2.8% and an increase 
of 3%. Short-term incentives (STIs) were at the highest during 2014 with an average 
value of around €500.000 euros and a median value of €395.000 euros, and during 2016 
(average €474.000 euros, median in this case, greater at €559 euros due to excel data 
being “skewed to the left”). (Figure 9, Table 4).  
 
Not all the 20 Finnish companies had LTIs for the group executive team (including the 
CEO). For instance, Telia Company’s long-term incentive program (performance shares 
equal to 30% of annual salary) does not include the CEO and group executive 
management, but a maximum number of key employees (Telia Company 2017).  
 
 
 
Figure 9. Average and median values of executive compensation components for the 20 Finnish 
companies, 2012-2016. 
 
When comparing and benchmarking Finland with U.S. within CEO pay mix, we can again 
see a considerable difference among the two countries. To cite an example, the CEOs of 
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two similar market cap companies, Sampo (total net profits for 2012-2016: €7,7 billion 
euros) and Hewlett Packard (total net profits for 2012-2016 €5,5 billion euros), received 
highly different average compensation between 2012 and 2016. Total average 
compensation for Sampo’s CEO amounted to €3,7 million euros, whereas Hewlett 
Packard’s CEO received a total compensation of €18,5 million euros ($21,9 million USD). 
Regarding the CEO pay mix, Sampo’s CEO received an average base salary of €900,000 
euros (€760,000 euros Hewlett Packard) €400,000 euros average of STIs (€1,9 million 
euros), €2,4 million euros of LTIs (€14,8 million euros) and €634,000 euros of pensions 
and benefits (€231,000 euros) – see Appendix 3, section 3 and 4 for full tables of 
executive compensation components. 
 
Table 4. Average and median values of executive compensation components for the 20 Finnish 
companies, 2012-2016. 
 
 
These considerable differences can be seen especially within LTIs components of 
executive pay in Finland and U.S. When comparing total average LTIs within the 20 
Finnish and U.S. companies, average total LTIs to the CEOs of the 20 U.S. companies 
between 2012 and 2016 surpassed the 20 Finnish firms by 425% (€5,6 million euros 
against €1,3 million euros). This can be reflected on both total and median values of 
executive compensation components (Figure 10 and 11). It must be highlighted again, 
that the amount represented in the proxy filings for the 20 U.S. companies corresponds 
to reported pay, not realized pay. When considering LTIs or equity incentive programs 
and equity based awards designed to maximise shareholder value, they are equally split 
between stocks and options among the 20 sample U.S. companies, whereas among the 
20 Finnish firms they come in form of share performance or restricted share plans. 
Therefore, while the Finnish CEO’s shareholder wealth is maximised through 
performance shares and restricted shares, in U.S. this comes with a more balanced 
combination of stock options, performance shares and restricted shares.   
AVERAGE Values 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012
Base Salary 884,064€             829,845€             863,656€             771,593€             818,157€             
STI 474,323€             427,010€             498,586€             370,489€             298,965€             
LTI 1,793,918.00€   1,209,925.07€   1,149,208.70€   1,560,576.09€   961,839.67€       
Pension and Benefits 344,258€             337,814€             2,829,599€         397,709€             355,542€             
MEDIAN Values 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012
Base Salary 827,300€             803,400€             826,232€             711,134€             792,680€             
STI 559,707.00€       292,191.00€       395,000.00€       294,498.00€       294,829.50€       
LTI 871,803€             772,760€             453,760€             398,888€             450,546€             
Pension and Benefits 308,388€             281,000€             414,118€             413,000€             316,698€             
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Figure 10. Executive compensation components, total, for the 20 Finnish and U.S. companies, 
2012-2016. 
 
 
 
Figure 11. Median values of executive compensation components for the 20 Finnish and U.S. 
companies, 2012-2016. 
 
Empirical evidence suggests that LTIs are an essential incentive for firms’ executives in 
both countries to seek for shareholder value maximisation and to align the interests of 
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the key personnel with the ones of the shareholders. The importance of LTIs, and 
subsequently pay for performance as the reward metric for shareholder value 
maximisation, was furthermore encountered during the qualitative analysis when looking 
at both annual reports from Finnish companies and proxy filings from U.S. companies, 
and how Finnish firms communicate to key personnel and shareholders when referring 
to shareholder value maximisation. The long-term incentive plans are “designed to align 
the goals of shareholders and key personnel in increasing the value of the company”, to 
“offer a competitive compensation that is based on holding shares in the company” (Elisa 
2016: 114). “A signiﬁcant portion of executive’s compensation is at-risk pay tied to the 
performance of the company and aligned with the value delivered to shareholders (Nokia 
2015: 94). A similar description of LTIs plans was encountered when reading the other 
companies annual reports or remuneration statements, very much in line with the proxy 
filings of the 20 U.S. companies “the majority of target total compensation for executives 
is performance-based as well as equity based to align their rewards with stockholder 
value” (Hewlett Packard 2016: 4). 
 
However, findings have found significant differences not only in total and median values 
(Table 6), but furthermore on the relationship between fixed and variable pay, and this 
dichotomy can represent perhaps one of the main difference in shareholder value 
maximisation within executive compensation in Finland and U.S. While findings seem to 
suggest that, within the 20 Finnish companies, base salary is an important component 
of CEO fixed pay, representing about 39% of total CEO pay over the years 2012-2016, 
in U.S. base salary, thus fixed pay, represented an aggregate of only 10% of total CEO 
pay, according to the data collected from the 20 companies’ proxy filings.  
 
Table 6. Average and median values of executive compensation components for the 20 U.S. 
companies, 2012-2016 (in $USD and euros). 
 
 
AVERAGE Values 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012
Base Salary 1,150,389.10$        1,075,167.60$          1,047,493.40$           988,805.10$             1,050,148.68$       
STI 2,970,561.59$        2,169,030.16$          2,268,890.15$           2,519,882.05$          2,487,682.67$       
LTI 6,846,176.50$        6,501,231.80$          6,516,645.50$           7,206,805.00$          6,422,496.53$       
Pension and Benefits 812,636.89$           1,549,753.50$          360,593.25$               1,042,187.95$          2,065,761.22$       
MEDIAN Values 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012
Base Salary 1,075,000.00$        990,865.50$              907,588.00$               1,000,000.00$          975,000.00$           
STI 1,962,000.00$        1,681,250.00$          1,869,652.50$           2,635,437.50$          2,040,000.00$       
LTI 5,532,825.50$        6,255,872.00$          5,444,483.00$           4,500,018.00$          4,754,312.00$       
Pension and Benefits 291,160.00$           230,939.50$              185,191.00$               275,334.00$             217,198.00$           
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U.S. firms seem more inclined towards equity incentive programs that tie CEO salary 
more closely to share performance when maximising shareholder value. The reasons 
behind the differences on annual LTIs between Finland and U.S., especially if compared 
to base salary, and the contrast between fixed and variable pay, could be due to various 
reasons: again, to the fact that in U.S. the proxy filings are only disclosing reported pay, 
not realised pay, and the differences within industry, company’s size, stock price 
volatility, market size and price performance. More importantly, due to institutional 
ownership and more independent boards (Fernandes at al. 2012: 38). As previously 
explained on page 9, the concentration of ownership in Finland is very much less 
dispersed if compared to U.S.: the Anglo-American corporate governance system is 
primarily based on disperse corporate ownership, with the management having control 
over the corporation. As in U.S. there is more dispersed ownership, and less 
concentration of family-owned businesses, this can result in CEOs, executives (and top 
managers) being less dominated by a large block of internal shareholders, which could 
in return increase the use of equity-based compensation and tie the CEO very closely to 
performance, aligning the interest of CEO with the ones of the shareholders, thus 
increasing shareholder value maximisation. While Finland has been moving towards an 
Anglo-American corporate governance model, still the ownership is less dispersed, and 
a larger presence of family-owned businesses and larger insider shareholder groups 
could explain the more stable balance of fixed and variable pay, and especially the fact 
that LTIs do not outpace base salary as executive compensation components.    
4.5 Stock options and shareholdings as shareholder wealth portfolio   
 
As previously explained, in order to fully understand executive compensation within 
shareholder value maximisation, one has to look at the aggregate number of shares, 
restricted shares, and stock options held by the CEO: as claimed by Jensen and Murphy 
(1990), this factor represents the strongest relationship and correlation between 
executive compensation and shareholder wealth. We will analyse how the companies 
` 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012
Base Salary 1,081,609€             925,074€                   901,263€                    850,768€                   903,548€                
STI 2,516,685€             1,866,234€                1,952,153€                 2,168,107€               2,140,402€            
LTI 5,805,042€             5,512,555€                5,525,625€                 6,110,828€               5,445,794€            
Pension and Benefits 699,193€                 1,333,408€                310,254€                    896,699€                   1,777,381€            
MEDIAN Values 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012
Base Salary 924,930€                 852,541€                   780,889€                    860,400€                   838,890€                
STI 1,535,814€             1,446,548€                1,608,649€                 2,267,531€               1,755,216€            
LTI 4,691,420€             5,304,509€                4,616,512€                 3,815,677€               4,031,299€            
Pension and Benefits 250,514€                 198,700€                   159,338€                    236,897€                   186,877€                
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taken into exam can maximise shareholder value of executives through the use of 
shareholdings and stock option plans. 
 
4.5.1 Theoretical framework  
 
As explained on page 13, stock options are derivative instruments that give the right, 
but not the obligation, to buy or sell a security or an asset at an established price. Stock 
options are valued as the economic cost for the company to grant an option to the 
employee: they represent the opportunity cost forgone by not selling the option in the 
open market (Conyon 2006: 26). Stock options came to importance during the 1980s 
and 1990s when firms had realized that by requesting executives and the management 
to invest their wealth in the company’s equity (through share and stock options plans), 
they would have the same ultimate purpose of the shareholders – maximising share 
price (Wharton 2002).  
 
Previous researches by Tehranian and Wegelein (1985), and De Fusco et al. (1990), 
have found a positive correlation between stock option plans and shareholder wealth. 
Yermack (1997), cited in Pasternack (2002: 1), explains that one reason is that stock 
options could encourage executives to make better decisions. The second reason is that 
these executives could have an influence upon the introduction of the stock option and 
might attempt to time the introduction to moments that precede positive news.  
 
If the CEO is paid in shares, when the share price increases, the value of their shares 
also increases, and if the price decreases, the option value decreases accordingly, and 
therefore the CEO wealth as a shareholder (Conyon 2006: 27). If a CEO is granted stock 
options, the shares are not actually “owned” or “held” until the options are fully exercised 
by the CEO (at the predetermined strike price or exercise price). Executives or employees 
who have been granted stock option plans (ESOP), expect to profit by exercising the 
options at the strike price when the shares are trading at a price higher than the strike 
price, thus making profit (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 2014). If compared 
to base salaries or performance shares, stock option plans have no relation to firm 
performance (Conyon 2006). In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, stock options 
and large bonuses have been held responsible for the companies’ risky behaviour and 
short-term strategies: studies have found that stock options-based pay could 
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significantly increase the probability of earnings manipulation, shareholder lawsuits, and 
product safety problems. If executives’ pay is based on a financial measure, executives 
will maximize their performance based on this measure (Cable & Vermeulen 2016).   
 
Bergman and Jenter (2004, as quoted in Mäkinen 2007: 7), claim that stock options are 
used to compensate risk-adverse employees. In their view, risk-adverse employees have 
more optimistic expectations on stock price developments if compared to outside risk 
neutral-investors. Pasternack (2002), by analysing 80 stock option grants of publicly 
listed Finnish firms between 1994 and 1999, finds that ownership concentration and 
liquidity have a negative effect of stock options as part of a compensation scheme. CEO 
ownership and historical market returns are positively related to the possibility of 
adopting a stock option program. During the 1990s in U.S., stock options for CEOs more 
than tripled (adjusted to inflation). Thereafter, according to S&P 500, they remained 
mostly stagnant in the beginning of 2000s, and declined during the 2008-2009 after the 
financial crisis (Murphy 2012). 
 
Jones et al. (2004), states that foreign ownership might influence the adoption of stock 
option schemes, and that if options would solve the principal agent problem, then foreign 
ownership would increase the probability of stock option schemes (Pasternack 2002). 
However, on Essays on Stock Options Schemes and Executive Compensation, Mäkinen 
finds no evidence that foreign ownership would support this hypothesis. Jones et al. 
(2007: 20) finds out how the adoption of stock options is a pro cyclical phenomenon. 
Stock market developments affect the use of stock options, and firms with higher market 
value per employee are more willing to use stock options compensation as it provides 
incentives at lower costs. The use of data from 1992 to 2003 assisted in analysing how 
market downturns and upturns can affect the use of stock options (Jones et al. 2004). 
By September of year 2000, 106 out of 157 companies listed in the Helsinki Stock 
Exchange had stock option programs, and the use of stock options in Finland was second 
after Great Britain (Baer 2000; Pasternack 2002). 
 
In 2005, media attention and criticism came upon Fortum Oyj, which is a partly 
government owned company. The firm’s option programs were heavily criticised for 
being too large (five different option plans) and for giving a significant amount of profit 
to executives. The Minister of Trade and Industry had to answer in lieu of accusations 
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towards the company’s stock options, which were worth half a billion euros (Tupala 
2006: 13). This can be related to the previously enounced concept of value extraction, 
instead of value creation, within shareholder value maximisation.   
4.5.2 Empirical evidence 
 
As previously explained, stock options are a component of LTIs (in form of derivatives), 
together with share performance compensation and restricted shares, forming a strong 
correlation between CEO compensation and shareholder wealth maximisation. The data 
collected, as mentioned on page 13, aims to show what is the aggregate wealth of the 
CEO between annual remuneration and value of shareholdings, showing the relationship 
between shareholder wealth and CEO wealth. The stock option data, especially within 
the value of exercised options, looks to what extent executives are covered by stock 
option programs, and how they can generate profit as shareholders from exercised 
options. When analysing stock options granted to the key personnel of the 20 analysed 
Finnish companies, the empirical evidence showed findings of only six Finnish firms, 
among the whole sample, granting stock options to the president and CEO. On the 100 
observations analysed between 2012 and 2016, only 12 observations out of 100 found 
evidence of granted stock options from equity incentive programs. Only Nokia, UPM 
Kymmene, Stora Enso, Nokian Renkaat, Huhtamäki and Cargotec showed evidence of 
granted options. Most of the stock option programs terminated between 2012 and 2013.  
 
In other companies, for instance Kone, the CEO and the executive management were 
not covered by stock option plans, whereas at Kesko the top management is not allowed 
to have share based programs and stock option plans at the same time. Within stock 
options granted in 2016 (but not exercised) by the CEO, empirical evidence has found 
only one case of the CEO been granted 60.000 options (Nokian Renkaat). In comparison, 
data on stock options exercised within the 20 U.S. companies evidenced 40 out of 100 
observations of exercised stock options (Figure 12). 7 out of 20 executives did not 
exercise any stock options between 2012 and 2016 (See Appendix 4, section 1 and 2 for 
full table of stock options and shares vested by CEO for the 20 U.S. companies. As the 
results for the 20 Finnish companies were quite irrelevant, they have not been included).  
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Figure 12. Exercised stock options and share vested (RSU and PSU) for the 20 U.S. companies, 
2012-2016. 
 
Empirical evidence in among the 20 U.S. companies has found a total value of €337 
million euros ($391 USD) of exercised stock options between 2012 and 2016, calculated 
as the effective exercise (therefore realized) date, not grant-date or target date. The 
highest year of exercised options among the 20 U.S. companies was 2013 with €87 
million euros options exercised ($103 million USD), the lowest being €52 million euros 
($61 million USD) in 2015, never the less a striking difference if compared with exercised 
options in Finland, whose empirical evidence does not show any comparable results 
within shareholder value maximisation of executives through stock option plans. 
Although no research was conducted on the exercise price of the options within the U.S. 
20 executives, we might assume that shares were trading at a higher price than the 
exercise price, and that by selling the shares the CEOs could generate profit for 
themselves, thus maximising shareholder wealth (value extraction). The almost absence 
of stock options exercised, with only 12 observations, among 100, of stock options 
granted to the CEO of the 20 Finnish companies can indicate that stock options programs 
among executives are not recognised as one of the main indicators of shareholder value 
maximisation in Finland during 2012 and 2016. This can perhaps be related to differences 
in institutional ownership between Finland and U.S., with managers having more control 
within the firm in U.S., as encountered in studies by Fernandes et al. (2012) and 
Jakobsson and Korkeamäki (2015), and due to the criticism on stock option programs 
received by the media, and particularly to Fortum, in 2005. In U.S. stock option plans 
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and especially options exercised are still a common practice among CEOs and executives, 
although their use has declined in place of performance and restricted shares plans. 
 
Regarding CEO shareholdings, whose direct ownership represents, according to Jensen 
and Murphy, the most powerful link between CEO wealth and shareholder wealth, in 
2016 the CEOs of the 20 sample Finnish companies held shares for a total of about €66,1 
million euros. Figure 13 shows executive compensation components (base salary, STIs, 
LTIs and pensions and benefits), together with the portfolio of shares by the CEO, thus 
representing the total wealth between fixed and variable pay and the wealth generated 
by the market value of shareholdings between 2012 and 2016. The CEO total shareholder 
wealth has increased not only by the increased number of shares, but most importantly 
by the share price development between 2012-2016.  
 
 
 
Figure 13. Executive compensation components and portfolio value of shareholdings for the 20 
Finnish companies, 2012-2016. 
 
The market value for CEOs’ shareholdings have been calculated with annual closing 
prices from 2012 to 2016. Average shareholding values for the CEO was €6.4 million 
euros in 2016, while median value was €1.9 million euros (Figure 14). As according to 
Jensen and Murphy’s argument regarding the “feedback effect”, empirical evidence has 
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not found any case of an executive or CEO, within the 100 observations of the 20 Finnish 
firms, holding a significant amount of outstanding shares within the company.  
 
The only exception encountered, outside the CEOs, was Antti Herlin, the chairman of 
KONE, the largest shareholder of the company with about 22% of the company’s shares 
(70,561,608 class A shares and 45,184,977 class B shares, of which only the latter are 
listed in the OMXH). The total market value of Herlin’s B shares in 2016 was €1.8 billion 
euros. In comparison, KONE’s CEO Ehmrooth Henrik owned a market value 
shareholdings of €10 million euros (among the highest within the 20 sample companies). 
Average values of CEO shareholdings’ portfolio market value was largely influenced by 
Sampo, KONE, UPM Kymmene and Nokia, therefore median values gives us a more 
accurate idea of CEO shareholdings’ market value within the 20 Finnish companies. A 
full table of CEOs’ shareholdings based on annual closing share prices during 2012-2016 
can be found on Appendix 4, section 3. 
 
Figure 14. CEO portfolio shareholdings, average and median values for the 20 Finnish companies, 
2012-2016. 
 
Current CEO Shareholdings from the 20 sample U.S. companies, in comparison, totalled 
€241 million euros ($274 million USD), a significant difference from the Finnish 
companies (Figure 15). Average CEO shareholdings’ market value, according to the 20 
samples companies and the data collected from the Morning Star website, amounted to 
€12 million euros ($13.6 million USD), twice the average value among the 20 Finnish 
companies.    
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Figure 15. CEO shareholdings total market value, 20 Finnish and U.S. companies, 2012-2016. 
 
Median shareholdings’ value was €7.3 million euros ($8.3 million USD). Average and 
median values among the 20 U.S. companies are more balanced, if compared with the 
20 Finnish firms (Figure 16).  
 
 
Figure 16. Average and median values of CEO shareholdings, 20 Finnish and U.S. companies, 
2012-2016. 
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While stock options to executives of the 20 Finnish companies (confirmed not only by 
the absence of exercised options but furthermore by the absence of stock option plans 
to executives) seem not to be a common practice in Finland within shareholder value 
maximisation and linking shareholder wealth to executive compensation, Finnish CEO 
pay relies on a stable fixed pay (based mostly on base salary) and variable pay based 
on the pay for performance concept through LTIs (share-based incentive plans).  
Descriptive statistics have shown that total market value of shares held by the CEO 
amounted to €66,1 million euros, a rather low value if compared to the €241 million 
euros market value of U.S. CEO shareholdings. In the latter sample, empirical evidence 
shows a more balanced combination of stock options and shareholdings, while PSU 
(Performance Share Unit) and RSU (Restricted Stock Unit) seems to be delivered as part 
of long incentive programs in the U.S. within shareholder value maximisation.  
 
As explained in the thesis limitations, we can only make assumptions on why in Finland 
and in U.S. the amount of shareholdings granted to the executives differ. Again, 
according to same sources (Fernandes at al. 2012), these differences can be related to 
institutional ownership and independency of the board. The authors explain how U.S. 
firms make higher use of stock options and restricted shares to executives, if compared 
to other countries – according to a 2012 study which compares U.S. firms to other 13 
countries. Differences in corporate governance between Finland and U.S. might suggest 
that a more disperse ownership in U.S., and institutional owners, results in the higher 
adoption of stock option plans to the CEO: in this matter, shareholder value maximisation 
through stock options plans and shareholdings, together with value extraction from the 
exercise of stock options (executives generating wealth for themselves) is encountered 
to a higher level in the U.S. than in Finland.  
4.6 Dividends 
4.6.1 Theoretical framework 
 
As part of the pay-out policy on shareholder value maximisation, dividends are one of 
the two main ways a company utilizes to return capital to their shareholders, as 
mentioned on page 13 – the other one being share repurchases. One of the claims 
supporting the research questions, stated by the Limited Liability Company Act, is that 
the purpose of a company is to generate profits for the shareholders, unless otherwise 
provided in the Articles of Association. The profit derived from dividend payments 
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compensates the risk that investors have to bear when deciding upon investing in a 
certain firm (Brealey, Myers & Allen 2011). Reason why dividends are a crucial indicator 
of shareholder value maximisation, as explained on the methodology section. 
Previous studies on dividends have found several empirical observations: firstly, large 
and established firms usually pay out a significant percentage of their earnings to their 
shareholders in form of dividends - as we will evidence within larger Finnish companies. 
Secondly, dividends have been an historical predominant form of pay-out. This until the 
1980s, where especially in U.S., most firms initiated cash payments to their shareholders 
with share repurchases, which were not a utilized form of pay-out before the 1980s 
(Allen & Michaely 2002: 4). 
 
A company’s dividend is decided by the board of directors, and the announcement of 
dividends states that payments will be distributed to the shareholders registered on a 
certain record date (Brealey, Myers & Allen 2011: 393). The challenge to firms and 
financial economists has been to develop a pay-out policy where companies can 
maximise shareholder wealth, and where investors can maximise utility (Allen & Michaely 
2002: 4). Investors do certainly take comfort if a firm increases its dividends, and when 
the firm announces an increase, analysts up the forecasts on a company’s earnings. It 
should not surprise then that an increase in dividends might be followed by an increase 
in stock price (Brealey, Myers & Allen 2011: 396).  From an investor’s point of view, 
investors are also seen as risk avoiders believing that dividends income is a stable and 
reliable source of investment (Gordon 1963, quoted in Lindeman 2016: 20). 
 
Usually most of the U.S. companies pay a dividend regularly each quarter (Brealey et al. 
2011: 393), while in Finland dividends are paid once per year. Dividends are double 
taxed in Finland (as in many other countries): a firm’s profits are subject to a corporate 
tax of 20%, and if a company is distributing part of the profit as dividends to its 
shareholders, the dividends are subject to a capital gains tax which is usually 30% 
(Lindeman 2016: 28).  
 
4.6.2 Empirical analysis: evidence from Finland 
 
The data collected on dividends between 2012 and 2016 aims to show to what extent 
the 20 Finnish companies aimed at maximising value for their shareholders through 
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returning excess cash in form of dividends paid, and increasing dividends per share over 
time. With a strong dividend policy, as explained above, companies can maximise 
shareholder value and wealth, and investors can maximise utility. During years 2012-
2016, the analysed Finnish companies paid a total of €42,3 billion euros in dividends, 
meaning that €42,3 billion euros was distributed in cash to return capital and reward the 
companies’ shareholders. Analysing the total dividends paid during 2012-2016, we can 
notice that total dividends paid decreased between 2012 and 2013 by 7% (attributable 
mostly to Nokia not paying any dividends for the year), then increased by 17% in 2014, 
16% in 2015 and 9% in 2016 (Figure 17). Total dividends paid increased, from 2012 to 
2016, by 43%, from €6,1 billion euros in 2012 to €9,4 billion euros in 2016.   
  
 
 
Fig 17. Total dividends paid for the 20 Finnish companies, 2012-2016. 
 
Nordea is the company that paid the largest dividends to their shareholders with a total 
of €9.2 billion euros of dividends, and with a constant increase of dividends paid each 
year during 2012 and 2016 (Figure 18): the percentage growth of dividends paid by 
Nordea to its shareholders rose by 147% from 2012 to 2016, while average dividends 
paid grew by 26,2%. The second largest market cap company, Nokia, did not pay any 
dividends between 2013 and 2014 (due to a loss of €3,7 billion euros in net profits during 
2012). Despite financial difficulties and drop in share price within the past years, the 
company paid €1,5 billion euros in dividends in 2016, an increase of almost 196% if 
compared to the €500 million euros paid in 2015. After Nordea, the second and third 
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company paying the largest dividends were respectively Telia and Sampo, with 
respectively €6,1 and €5,2 billion euros. However, Telia’s dividends paid in 2016 
decreased by 33%, while dividends paid in 2015, 2014 and 2013 did not increase. The 
company with the highest average increase in dividends paid between 2012-2016 was 
Neste with 33%, while Outokumpu was the only company not paying any dividends 
during the five years’ time.   
 
 
Figure 18. Dividends paid per company for the 20 Finnish companies, 2012-2016. 
 
What is important to consider in regards of shareholder value maximisation, is 
particularly the dividends paid as a percentage of a company’s total net profits. Of the 
total net profits of €57 billion euros over the years 2012-2016, €42 billion euros were 
returned and distributed to shareholders as dividends (Figure 19). If we compare the 
dividends paid as percentage of the company’s net profits, companies have different 
dividends policies, as evidenced on their annual reports. Elisa for instance, follows a high 
and stable dividend policy (80% to 100% of previous year’s net profits) and in 2016 
distributed 92% of the previous year’s net profits in dividends. Telia Company has a 
dividend policy of distributing a minimum of 80% of free cash flows from continuous 
operations in dividends. This varies among companies, depending on their dividend 
policy (Sampo distributes 50% of net profits, Neste at least 40%, Stora Enso 50%, as 
reported in the annual reports and investor relations).  
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Statistics have shown that the overall average value of dividends distributed compared 
to net profits was 49%, depending on the company’s net profits for the year. Over the 
five years between 2012-2016, the 20 publicly traded companies have distributed a total 
of 73% of their net profits in dividends, as we can see on Table 7. This means that the 
remaining 27% was reinjected back into the business as retained earnings. This total 
73% represents how companies return excess cash to their shareholders, thus rewarding 
investors and maximising shareholder value. Companies such as Telia Company, UPM 
Kymmene, Elisa and Kesko paid an average of respectively 103%, 88%, 108% and 84% 
of dividends compared to net profits between 2012 and 2016. While average dividends 
paid over the years 2012-2015 was 51%, median value was 64%. These values are 
heavily influenced by Nokia’s results, as dividends compared to net profits have resulted 
to -189.7%, as the company has made heavy loss in 2012 with almost -€3.8 billion. 
Never the less, however a publicly traded company is making loss, investors are still 
expecting yearly dividends. Full tables of 100 observations of dividends paid and net 
profits for the 20 Finnish companies can be found on Appendix 5, section 1 and 2.  
 
 
 
Figure 19. Profits returned to shareholders versus retained profits over net total profits for the 20 
Finnish companies, 2012-2016. 
 
If we view the total net profits among the 20 publicly Finnish listed firms, we can refer 
back to the theoretical framework that the 20 companies are using a high dividend policy. 
Total dividends paid during 2012-2016 shows that the 20 Finnish companies are aiming 
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at maximizing shareholder value through a high, stable and growing dividend policy. 
From an investor’s point of view, and referring back to Gordon (1963), cited in Lindeman 
(2016), and Allen and Michaely (2002), this high dividend policy rewards and maximise 
shareholder value for the investors who bear the risk upon investing into the 20 Finnish 
firms.  
 
Table 7. Dividends paid as percentage of net profit, for the 20 Finnish companies, 2012-2016. 
 
  
   
When looking at dividends per share during 2012-2016, the average dividend per share 
decreased from 2012 to 2013, then increased from 2013 to 2016, with the highest 
increases between 2014-2015 at 11%, and 2015-2016 at 13% (Table 8). Average 
dividend per share among the 20 Finnish companies was €1.13 euros in 2016 (dividends 
paid on 2017). Median dividend has decreased during 2012 and 2014, and then increased 
through 2015 and 2016. Median dividend per share was €1.08 euros for the year 2016.   
 
Table 8. Average, median, STDev and year growth of dividend per share for the 20 Finnish 
companies, 2012-2016. 
 
 
 
Average, median values and standard deviation of dividends per share are represented 
graphically in Figure 20. Empirical evidence among the 20 companies has found out that 
within 100 observations, in 50 cases between 2012 and 2016 there has been an increase 
in dividends: for instance, Nordea’s dividends per share increased from €0.26 to €0.64 
in five years, Sampo’s from €1.35 to €2.3 euros, and Kesko’s from €1.2 to €2.5 euros 
(see Appendix 5, section 3 for a full table). Within 13 cases there has been no increase 
in dividends, and within 10 cases a decrease on dividends. Within 7 cases across three 
companies, Outokumpu, SSAB and Nokia, there were no dividends paid. Companies such 
Year 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 TOT
Tot Net Income 10,667,337,364€  16,152,247,723€  15,658,610,384€  8,558,415,658€     6,647,174,999€     57,683,786,127€          
Tot Dividends Paid 10,338,559,235€  9,441,682,324€    8,111,169,160€    6,957,887,363€     7,441,876,377€     42,291,174,459€          
% of Dividends to 
Net Profit 97% 58% 52% 81% 112% 73%
Dividend per Share 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012
Average 1.13 1.00 0.91 0.89 0.90
Median 1.08 1.05 0.85 0.87 0.90
ST Deviation 0.63 0.52 0.49 0.49 0.56
AVG Growth % 13% 11% 1% -1%
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as Sampo, Nordea and Kesko seem to believe in a strong, increasing dividends policy as 
a way to maximise shareholder value over time.    
 
 
 
Figure 20. Average, median and standard deviation of dividends per share for the 20 Finnish 
companies, 2012-2016. 
 
In comparison, U.S. companies paid a total of €20.1 billion euros ($23.1 billion USD) in 
dividends between 2012 and 2016 (Figure 21). However, if we compare the net profits 
between Finnish companies during the five years (€57 billion euros) and U.S. companies 
(€26 billion euros), the ratio differs between respectively 73% and 77,2% as percentage 
of net profits returned to their shareholders in form of dividends. Although almost all the 
20 Finnish companies, apart from Outokumpu with no dividends (and to a less extent, 
SSAB and Nokia), have paid dividends over 2012-2016, five of the 20 U.S. companies 
have paid no dividends during the same years (see Appendix 5, section 4 and 5 for a full 
table of dividends paid and net profits for the U.S. firms).  
 
Results on total dividends paid showed that Finnish companies paid more than twice the 
amount of total dividends, if compared with the 20 U.S. companies. We will view on the 
next two chapters the reasons behind it, and which one is the preferred method for the 
U.S. companies to return capital to shareholders.  
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Figure 21. Total dividends paid for the 20 Finnish and U.S. companies, 2012-2016.  
 
Average dividend per share of U.S. companies did not decrease during the five years’ 
time, showing the highest increase between 2015 and 2016 at 16%, and between 2013 
and 2014 at 12% (Figure 22, Table 10). See Appendix 5, section 6 for a full table. 
 
 
 
Figure 22. Average and median values of dividends per share for the 20 Finnish and U.S. 
companies, 2012-2016. 
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Table 10. Average and median values of dividends per share for the 20 U.S. companies, in USD 
and Euros, 2012-2016. 
 
 
 
The profit returned to shareholders as dividends compared to retained profit did not 
differ significantly from the 20 Finnish companies, when comparing it as percentage of 
total profit (Figure 23).  
 
 
Figure 23. Profits returned to shareholders versus retained profits over net total profits for the 20 
U.S. companies, 2012-2016. 
 
Empirical evidence suggests that the 20 analysed Finnish companies are aiming to 
maintain a stable dividend policy, and paid a total of €42,3 billion euros in dividends, if 
compared to the €20,1 billion euros paid by the 20 U.S. companies – although results in 
net profits showed differences between the two samples. The quantitative analysis has 
shown that the Finnish companies are aiming at maximising shareholder value through 
a strong and stable dividend policy, increasing dividends per share over time and 
rewarding investors for bearing the risk when investing into Finnish companies. This is 
furthermore supported by the way companies communicate to shareholders. Most 
2016 2015 2014 2013 2012
AVG  $ USD 1.29 1.12 1.08 0.97 0.90
Median $ USD 1.10 1.00 0.98 0.80 0.76
AVG € EUR 1.11 0.96 0.93 0.83 0.77
MEDIAN € EUR 0.94 0.86 0.84 0.69 0.65
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companies, within the annual reports, openly communicate to shareholders how it is 
critical to maintain a stable dividend policy to maximise shareholder value over time:  
 
“Sampo is a dividend stock and increasing shareholder value is our main task.” 
(Sampo 2013: 5).  
 
“Nordea has a market commitment of strong capital generation and efficiency, 
with return of excess capital to shareholders. The ambition is to achieve a yearly 
increase in the dividend per share.” (Nordea 2016: 32).  
 
“The dividend policy ensures that shareholders receive a fair remuneration for their 
entrusted capital, supported by the company’s long-term strategy that aims at 
increasing earnings per share and thereby the dividend” (Fortum 2016: 28).  
 
4.7 Share repurchases or buybacks 
4.7.1 Theoretical framework 
 
As previously mentioned, share repurchases or buybacks are one of the most important 
indicators that companies are seeking to maximise shareholder value, and they are 
closely associated as a mean of increasing shareholder wealth. In U.S. they have been 
popular for over 25 years, with the amount of cash used for repurchases almost doubled 
over the last decade (Keasler & Byerly 2015: 11). Once the shares are bought back, the 
number of outstanding shares of a company is reduced. There are several reasons why 
a company decides to perform share repurchases, which have been widely studied, while 
common knowledge of corporate finance links undervalued stock with share 
repurchases. Undervalued stock has been often mentioned as the most important 
reason. Due to asymmetric information between shareholders and managers, share 
repurchases announcements can reveal information that the management has 
concerning the value of the company (Smura 2007: 5). This reason is called signalling 
theory. 
 
Jensen (1986), quoted by Dittmar (2000: 331), claims that firms repurchase stock to 
distribute excess cash. Repurchasing stocks, like paying dividends, is one method used 
to distribute excess cash to shareholders. This is also referred to as the excess capital 
hypothesis.  
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Share repurchases are a widely-used instrument for managing capital structure, which 
is very often connected to the use of stock options (Kivi 2006: 14). By performing stock 
repurchases, companies can prevent the dilution caused by using stock options in 
executive compensation: upon giving stock options to managers as a part of their 
remuneration, a company might acknowledge that at some period of time it could be 
accountable to provide shares to the managers that have exercised options. Moreover, 
Fenn and Liang (1997), and Jolls (1996), cited in Frilander (2013: 18), suggest that stock 
options tend to have exercise prices below the share market prices, therefore increasing 
the chance of dilution at maturity. Managers also incentivised the use of buybacks to 
preserve the value of executive stock options, since the cash outflow is matched by a 
proportionate reduction of shares outstanding, unlike dividends (Smura 2007: 8). 
 
Therefore, the company would be left with the choice of either issuing new shares, which 
might imply having limited funds. Furthermore, the increased amount of outstanding 
shares could lead to a dilution of Earnings per Share (EPS, which is the earning of the 
companies divided by the total number of shares outstanding) and a lower market value, 
thus reducing shareholder wealth. Alternatively, the company could perform share 
repurchases. Together with increasing share price (and shareholder wealth), share 
repurchases have the effect of boosting EPS. CEOs are indeed compensated by EPS: 
however, even if a company is generating earnings growth every year, if it continues to 
issue new shares at a quicker or comparable rate, EPS will remain stagnant. In this case, 
investors do not reward the use of share repurchases (Kobayashi-Solomon 2015; Smura 
2007: 21).  
  
Another common reason for share repurchases is capital structure adjustments. A 
company’s value is maximised by an optimal ratio between debt and equity, which 
reduces the weighted average cost of capital (WACC). As the primary purpose of a 
company is to maximise shareholder value, executives and managers make use of 
financial leverage to increase Return on Equity (ROE) by increasing the debt to equity 
ratio. This is done by either using excess cash or issue debt for share repurchases (Smura 
2007: 6).  
  
Share repurchases have been another matter of criticism within the “myth” of 
shareholder value. Lazonick (2014), stated that in the last three decades in U.S. trillions 
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of dollars that could have spent in research and innovation were used to buy back shares 
for what he calls “stock manipulation”. During this timeframe, companies have gone 
further from the retain and reinvest strategy towards a downsize and distribute 
approach. This strategy affected stakeholders to an extent that income inequality and 
employment instability raised considerably (Larrabee 2014; Lazonick 2014). From 2003 
until 2012, 449 companies listed in the S&P 500 Index used 54% of their earnings (a 
total of $2.4 trillion USD) to buy back their own shares. An additional 37% of their 
earnings was absorbed in dividends. The rest was left for investments or higher income 
for employees (Lazonick 2014). 
 
According to a report from Goldman Sachs, 85,5% of S&P 500 companies perform 
routinely share repurchases (Kobayashi-Solomon 2015). On a larger scale, so many 
companies performing share repurchases as an alternative to increase capital budget 
can have a negative influence on business investment components of the aggregate 
demand within the economy, together with labour force (Keasler & Byerly 2015: 12). 
According to McKinsey (2006), markets have praised buybacks, making them a substitute 
in the actual improvements of a company’s performance. However, the use of buybacks 
increases EPS compensation targets (which might become a fixation for managers) and 
boosting EPS in such way does not represent an increase of underlying performance or 
value. A company which fixates too insistently on buybacks might come at the 
opportunity cost of focusing on the long-term investments and on the health of the 
company. 
 
In U.S., during an open market repurchase, which involves a gradual process of buying 
a small number of shares in the open market through a broker (the most conducted 
practice), a company does not have the commitment towards a repurchase. 
Furthermore, unlike a dividend payment, there is no expectation that the distribution will 
happen on regular basis (Dittmar 2000; Vermaelen 2017: 143). Finnish companies were 
allowed to conduct share repurchases only for less than twenty years. The first 
repurchases were dated back to 1998 (Smura 2007: 9). The regulations concerning share 
repurchases are much stricter in Finland if compared with U.S. Announcements are made 
when they call the annual meetings, and buybacks have to be authorized during the 
Annual General Meeting (AGM), as furthermore evidenced when analysing the 
companies’ annual reports. 
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Karhunen (2002), cited in Smura (2007: 11), had presented a study where he concluded 
that share repurchases are conducted by companies with low debt ratios, high cash flows 
and high dividends. A previous study by Smura, Share Repurchases in Finland: 
Descriptive Statistics from 2005 to 2007, which analysed and collected data volumes of 
1819 observations of share repurchases between January 2005 and September 2007 
retrieved from the DataStream database, found that among the 33 corporations who 
used open-market share repurchases during that period, the total value amounted to 
more than €12 billion euros, with 98% of the total value coming from six companies, 
and Nokia’s share repurchases only representing 88% of this value. 
 
Smura denotes that foreign ownership is a fundamental factor behind share repurchases 
in Finland. In 2005, Nokia spent about €150 million euros in share repurchases, rather 
than dividends. The author concluded, while following the performance of four 
corporation with the most active share repurchases in 2005 and 2006, that results did 
not support the signalling theory, as returns were lower than market returns.  
 
4.7.2 Empirical analysis: evidence from Finland 
 
The trend on share repurchases in Finland between 2012-2016 does not dissociate 
significantly from Smura’s study in 2005-2007. Upon gathering the data on the 20 Finnish 
firms during 2012-2016 to discuss how the companies are seeking to maximise 
shareholder value through share repurchases, results showed that there were only 31 
observations among 100, between 2012 and 2016, where Finnish companies had 
conducted share repurchases. Total share repurchases amounted to €1.2 billion euros 
(Figure 24). Eight of the twenty Finnish firms did not perform any share repurchases 
between 2012 and 2016. Of these eight, two of them (Stora Enso and SSAB) did not 
resolve any authorization at the Annual General Meetings (AGM) during the years 2012-
2016. The years 2012 and 2013 did not have a large amount of share repurchases, with 
Nokia not performing any share buybacks. The only company driving up the amount of 
share repurchases was KONE with about €37 million euros in 2012 and €62 million euros 
in 2013. An increase of buybacks can be seen in 2014, with Nokia repurchasing €426 
million euros of its own shares. Most of the other share repurchases during 2014 were 
minor (KONE repurchased €32 million euros of shares). Therefore, the major driver for 
share repurchases in 2014 was again Nokia.  
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Share repurchases in 2015 and 2016 were again largely influenced by Nokia, with €170 
million euros in 2015 and €230 million euros in 2016. The other companies were again 
in influent during these two years regarding the value of share repurchase, with the only 
exception of KONE, which repurchased respectively €71 million and €39 million euros of 
shares in 2015 and 2016. Many of the other share repurchases were connected to cover 
commitments under LTI programs and share based incentive programs. Nokia’s share 
repurchases seems to be conducted for more than one reason: a look at the company’s 
EPS has found that basic EPS was 0.07 at the end of 2013 and 0.73 at the end of 2014, 
which seems to suggest that Nokia’s €1.25 billion euros buybacks conducted during 
2014-2015 aimed to boost EPS and to reduce the number of outstanding shares on the 
market, to prevent the price from falling. Nokia’s share price did not increase 
significantly: from €6.11 euros per share upon the commencement of the share 
repurchase program on July 2014, Nokia’s share price annual closing was €6.56 euros 
at the end of the year.  
 
 
 
Figure 24. Total share repurchases for the 20 Finnish companies, 2012-2016.  
 
The company has entered €1 billion euros share buyback program in June 2016, in line 
with the company’s €7 billion euros capital structure optimization program (capital 
structure adjustment theory) (Nokia 2016). Nokia made no allusion that the share price 
was undervalued (signalling theory): the execution of buybacks commenced on 
November 2016, and is valid until November 2017, therefore we can evidence that Nokia 
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has already repurchased €230 million euros of the company’s share buyback program. 
Some sources suggested that behind Nokia’s aggressive share buybacks announced in 
June 2016 there was the patent war between Nokia and Apple, with Nokia’s share price 
at 3-year low. Although Nokia has made no allusion on share price undervaluation, 
evidence seemed to suggest otherwise (Mueller 2017). Nokia’s share price closed at 
€4.59 euros at the end of 2016, with negative EPS at -0.13, for the first time since 2012 
(EPS at -0.16).  
 
Overall, the value of share repurchased between 2012 and 2016 was largely in influent 
for most of the 20 Finnish companies, except for Nokia, with a total of €830 million euros, 
alone totalling 69% of total share repurchases within the 20 Finnish companies, and 
KONE with €243 million euros (Figure 25), representing 20% ot the total. The trend 
during 2012-2016 does not seem to dissociate largely from Smura’s study during 2005-
2007. We can notice that the two companies in the financial sector, Nokia and Sampo, 
did not perform any share repurchases between 2012-2016 (see Appendix 6, section 1 
for a full table of share repurchases for the 20 Finnish companies). 
      
 
 
Figure 25. Share repurchases per company for the 20 Finnish companies, 2012-2016. 
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As denoted by Smura (2007) and Tomperi (2004), together with free cash flow and stock 
options, foreign ownership (in our case Nokia and Kone) seems to be also a characteristic 
of the buybacks to maximise shareholder value, denoted by this empirical evidence. If 
we compare the value of share repurchased between the Finnish and U.S. companies, 
we can notice significant differences in how firms return capital to their shareholders 
within shareholder value maximisation. In U.S., total buybacks between 2012 and 2016 
among the 20 U.S. companies amounted to €24.5 billion euros, with most of the analysed 
companies conducting share repurchases during 2012-2016 within the 100 observations. 
Between the five years, in 34 cases there had been no share repurchases (Figure 26) 
(See Appendix 6, section 2 for a full table). 
 
  
 
Figure 26. Share repurchases per company for the 20 U.S. companies, 2012-2016. 
 
While the two Finnish companies in the financial sector, Nokia and Sampo, did not 
perform any share repurchases, three of the four U.S. companies within the same sector 
performed share repurchases: Prudential Financial performed the largest share 
repurchases between 2012 and 2016, totalling €5.4 billion euros ($6.3 billion USD). 
 
Empirical evidence showed in stock option programs could suggest that U.S. firms might 
have entered more share buyback programs to prevent the dilution caused by stock 
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options, and to preserve their value – as U.S. stock options data illustrated a larger use 
of stock options programs for the CEO among the 20 U.S. companies. Within shareholder 
value maximisation, U.S. firms seem to focus on boosting EPS through share repurchases 
(and improving ROE), if compared to the 20 Finnish companies, which did not make a 
significant use of share repurchases during the same years. EPS within shareholder value 
maximisation, and its relationship with share repurchases, has been further discussed 
on Appendix 7. ROE as indicator of the firms’ profitability has been discussed on the 
same appendix. When maximising shareholder value, empirical evidence on Appendix 7 
could suggest that U.S. firms have higher EPS, perhaps due to the higher practice of 
share repurchases, when compared to the 20 Finnish companies (as explained on page 
15, the statistics have been divided according to industry sectors). While this might 
correlate directly to share repurchases, furthermore focusing more on EPS seems to be 
part of shareholder value maximisation of U.S. companies. Authors such as De Wet 
(2014), acknolwedges the pupularity of EPS as earnings are the most important measure 
of performance to be reported to investors.  
 
Regarding ROE as a traditional measurement of shareholder value maximisation for 
investors, Picardo (2015), as explained on page 14, suggests that one of the benefits of 
share repurchases is the improvement of ROE. When looking at the average ROE of 
Finnish and U.S. companies on the table within Appendix 7, share repurchase did not 
seem to have a significant influence on average ROE. In fact, firms that have not 
conducted any share repurchases (Michael Kors and Delphi Automotive within consumer 
goods, and Sampo and Apartment Investment within financial), performed better in 
terms of average ROE if compared to industry’s peers during 2012-2016. Never the less, 
there was not a significant relationship between share repurchases and ROE during 
2012-2016 when looking on how firms maximise shareholder value for investors through 
improved ROE, not to the same extent as the relationship encountered between share 
repurchases and EPS within Appendix 7.  
 
Furthermore, important differences seem to be at the core of corporate governance and 
ownership among firms between the two countries. In U.S., not only buybacks can be 
unannounced and are more often financed with debt, but most importantly, the fact that 
they do not need to be approved by the shareholders seem to influence the increased 
practice, if compared to Finland where buybacks are subject of approval during the 
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Annual General Meeting (AGM). As mentioned on page 9 and suggested by Jakobsson 
and Korkeamäki (2015), corporate law provides the Annual General Meeting (AGM) with 
a considerably larger and ultimate power over the corporation, and the AGM can replace 
the board at any time. As managers do not have the same control within the firm as in 
U.S., this might explain the lesser use of share repurchases within the 20 Finnish firms. 
4.8 Choice between dividends and share repurchases 
 
As previously mentioned, dividends and share repurchases can form a significant 
combination that can boost shareholder returns and maximise shareholder wealth, and 
this has been a subject of debate from the academics of the field. While the dividend is 
paid after-tax and it represent a definite return, buybacks can represent an uncertain 
future return, which is tax deferred until the shares are sold (Picardo 2015). Depending 
on what the shareholder time horizon is, buybacks are believed to have a short-term 
impact, while a longer-term advantage relies on dividend payments. While buybacks are 
often believed to serve as a compensation for companies’ insiders, dividends represent 
a real return of cash for shareholders (Ritholtz 2015). Share repurchases are usually 
more volatile than dividends (Allen & Michaely 2002).  
 
Empirical evidence and statistics have shown that Finland did not have a significant 
amount of share repurchases between the years 2012-2016, and most of the share 
repurchases were conducted by Nokia and KONE. If we compare the trend over the 
years 2012-2016, dividends paid have totalled €42.3 billion euros, whereas share 
repurchases’ value amounted to only €1 billion euros. Nokia seemed to conduct share 
repurchases over optimistic expectations to increase share price and EPS, as discussed 
on the previous chapter. Share repurchases have not been a popular method of returning 
cash, as denoted by a previous study (Smura 2007).  
 
While in U.S. they have been gaining popularity after the 1980s, in Finland the first share 
repurchases were authorized in 1997. Perhaps the smaller size of the market and the 
inclination towards a stable dividend policy looking at long-term advantages for 
shareholders, rather than short-term gains (as Ritholtz suggests on the use of buybacks), 
can indicate how Finnish firms chose dividends towards share repurchases to maximise 
shareholder value. Furthermore, we have mentioned how the prior approval by the 
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Annual General Meeting and its control over the company might influence the use of 
share repurchases.  
 
Although we did not take into analysis all the companies listed in the OMXH, we believe 
the 20 companies taken into exam, by being the largest market cap companies, are a 
good indicator of the choice of dividends over buybacks when returning cash to 
shareholders, within shareholder value maximisation. Empirical evidence suggested a 
different trend in the U.S. during 2012-2016, a more equal balance between share 
repurchases and dividends when distributing cash to the shareholders. Share 
repurchases, with €24.5 million euros, seems to be the first chosen method for 
distributing excess cash to shareholders during 2012-2016. Figure 27 shows a 
comparison on the choice between dividends and share repurchases among the Finnish 
and U.S. firms. 
 
 
 
Figure 27. Total dividends paid versus share repurchases for the 20 Finnish and 20 U.S. 
companies, 2012-2016. 
 
Again, mentioning Ritholtz, and by citing the criticism on the media over buybacks 
conducted by U.S. companies, an interest towards the short-term impact, the managerial 
control of the corporation, and the larger use of stock options, which might encourage 
the use of share repurchases in U.S., seems to be a more commong practice when 
maximising value for shareholders. By comparing dividends and share repurchases within 
all 40 companies (Figure 28), we can see how Finland is still anchored towards a strong 
dividend policy over share repurchases, when returning excess cash to shareholders. 
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Empirical evidence seems to suggest that within the five years, U.S. has a more balanced 
method of returning cash to shareholders, for instance in 2015, when a total of €10 
billion euros (about $11.4 USD) was paid back to shareholders in form of €4.8 billion 
euros dividends ($5.4 billion USD) and €5.3 billion euros ($6 billion dollars) in form of 
share repurchases.   
 
 
Figure 28. Total dividends paid versus share repurchases for the 20 Finnish and U.S. companies, 
2012-2016. 
  
This can be evidenced furthermore when looking at the whole S&P 500 companies 
regarding the trends of share repurchases gaining more popularity over dividends in 
U.S., a trend that has been increasing since the end of 2004, and gained popularity again 
after 2010 after the financial crisis of 2008 (Figure 29). 
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Figure 29. S&P 500 buybacks and dividends (Source: Standard & Poor’s, 2017). 
  
Empirical evidence in Finland showed an increase in aggregate and average dividends, 
and dividends paid over the years 2012-2016, which suggests that Finnish firms prefer 
to utilize dividends over buybacks to distribute excess cash to their shareholders as pay-
out policy to maximise shareholder value over the long-term. This has been furthermore 
suggested by the qualitative analysis when looking at annual reports across the 20 
Finnish firms, and when compared with the U.S. shareholder value model.  
5 Conclusion 
 
Within its limitations, this thesis has found sufficient empirical evidence that supports 
the initial research questions, hypothesis or claim that Finnish firms aim at maximising 
shareholder value. Shareholder value maximisation within the 20 Finnish companies is 
conducted mostly through a stable dividend policy, and an increase of dividends per 
share over time during 2012-2016. While long term incentives (LTIs) within executive 
compensation are considered an important part of CEO pay, base salary is still an 
important component of annual compensation, therefore variable pay does not outpace 
fixed pay. In the U.S., in contrast, annual CEO pay is tied to performance to a higher 
extent, and variable pay in forms of equity-based programs represents about 90% of 
CEO annual pay. Empirical evidence has not encountered significant stock option plans 
among executives, during 2012 and 2016: only six Finnish firms, among the 20 sample 
companies, have granted stock options (unexercised) to the president and CEO.  
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Furthermore, findings have shown that most companies have adopted no option plans 
for executives or top management between 2012 and 2016. Exercised options have 
shown significant difference when compared with U.S. firms’ executives, whose total 
exercised stock options totalled €337 million euros ($391 USD) between 2012 and 2016. 
Share repurchases or buybacks as the other method to return capital to shareholders 
and maximise shareholder value are not widely conducted in Finland: share repurchases 
were largely influenced by Nokia and Kone, with respectively 69% and 20% of the total 
value of share repurchases between 2012-2016. Empirical evidence has shown that 
Finnish firms choose dividends, rather than buybacks, to reward their shareholders. The 
total value of share repurchases amount (€1 billion euros) was in influent when 
compared to U.S. companies (€24.5 billion euros, $29 billion USD), who chose rather a 
combination of dividends and share repurchases to return capital to shareholders.  
 
While supporting the claim from Mähönen that Finland has been moving towards the 
Anglo-American corporate governance and thus shareholder model, empirical evidence 
has found however that significant differences exist between the shareholder value 
models in Finland and U.S., especially within average and median CEO pay, LTIs, stock 
option plans and the use of share repurchases versus dividends. One of the reasons 
behind differences of variable pay, most importantly LTIs, and the different balance 
between fixed and variable pay, can be related to the U.S. companies disclosing reported 
pay, rather than realized pay in the proxy filings. The other reasons, which could explain 
the higher level of stock option plans and restricted shares within executives in the U.S., 
when compared to Finland, could be related to the differences in market size, stock price 
volatility, and most importantly, differences in corporate governance and ownership 
between Finland and U.S. A more disperse ownership, institutional owners and 
independency of the board might results in higher adoption of stock option plans to the 
CEO in U.S., as explained during the empirical evidence. 
 
The empirical data suggests furthermore that there seemed to be no indicators of 
corporate malfeasance within the Finnish firms, and value creation, more than value 
extraction (especially with the absence of massive use of stock options for short-term 
gains), seems to be at the core of shareholder value maximisation philosophy. The only 
subject of critique by the media seemed to be Elop’s overcompensation upon his 
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departure from Nokia as CEO. The Liability Company Act and the Finnish Corporate 
Governance Code ensure that all rules are abided in accordance with the comply or 
explain principle, and that Finnish firms’ executives are incentivised to pursue the 
company’s goals and align their interests with the ones of the shareholders over a long-
term perspective.  
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Sample of Observations: Share Repurchases 2012-2016. The Red Circle Represents One Observation.  
 
 
 
 
Company
Market Cap, 
Million €
2016 2015 2014 2013 2012
1 Nordea Bank AB 43698.98 no share rep no share rep no share rep no share rep no share rep
2 Nokia Oyj 25141.72 230,610,185€          173,450,200€            426,726,459€        no share rep no share rep
3 Sampo Oyj 23352 no share rep no share rep no share rep no share rep no share rep
4 Kone Oyj 22783.11 39,255,224€            71,200,000€               32,800,000€          62,900,000€        36,900,000€          
5 Telia Company AB 16341.74 474,255€                  102,680€                     604,900€                406,033€              no share rep
6 Fortum Oyj 13458.76 no share rep no share rep no share rep no share rep no share rep
7 UPM-Kymmene Oyj 12756.28 no share rep no share rep no share rep no share rep no share rep
8 Neste Oyj 8661.32 no share rep no share rep 14,308,416€          no share rep no share rep
9 Wärtsilä Oyj Abp 8520.82 no share rep no share rep no share rep no share rep no share rep
10 Stora Enso Oyj 8501.66 no authorization no authorization no authorization no authorization no authorization
11 Orion Oyj 6050.48 16,765,946€            no share rep no share rep 9,600,000€           no share rep
12 Elisa Oyj 5294.48 no share rep no share rep no share rep no share rep no share rep
13 Nokian Renkaat Oyj 4782.73 no share rep no share rep no share rep no share rep no authorization
14 Kesko Oyj 4626.01 no share rep no share rep 16,060,213€          no share rep no share rep
15 Metso Oyj 4199.23 no share rep 8,312,138€                 no share rep 9,540,417€           7,417,548€            
16 Huhtamäki Oyj 3686.48 no share rep no share rep no share rep no share rep no share rep
17 Outokumpu Oyj 3435.09 7,020,000€               no share rep no share rep no share rep no share rep
18 SSAB 3193.37 no authorization no authorization no authorization no authorization no authorization
19 Amer Sports Oyj 2993.75 no share rep 1,200,000€                 13,000,000€          5,400,000€           no share rep
20 Cargotec Oyj 2848.45 7,575,505€               3,349,326€                 867,737€                no share rep no share rep
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Economic Value Added (EVA) 
 
Some of the traditional performance evaluation methods, such as ROE or EPS, have 
been argued to be ineffective in sectors such as banking (Gounder et al. 2017), as they 
do not represent the true shareholder return. Firms can attempt a combination of the 
following metrics: economic profit, value creation, and total shareholder return (TSR) 
(Leahy 2000). Two more recent shareholder value measurement are Economic Value 
Added (EVA) and Market Value Added. EVA was developed by the management 
consulting firm Stern Stewart & Co., and named Economic Value Added (EVA): it is 
calculated as the difference between the Net Operating Profit After Tax (NOPAT) and 
the opportunity cost of invested capital. The opportunity cost is the result of multiplying 
the Weighted Average Cost of debt and equity Capital (WACC) and the amount of capital 
employed. Thus, the formula for EVA equals EVA = NOPAT – WACC*Capital (EVA, 2017). 
MVA shows the difference between the market value of a company and the capital 
investors contribute with (EVA.com 2016).  
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Executive Compensation: Total CEO Compensation for the 20 Finnish Companies 2012-2016.  
 
 
Company
Market Cap, 
Million € 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 Total
Nordea Bank AB 43698.98 2,071,015€             2,522,179€             2,398,946€             2,187,895€             2,128,431€             11,308,466€          
Nokia Oyj 25141.72 9,508,156€             6,306,325€             32,382,002€          10,276,496€          4,524,948€             62,997,927€          
Sampo Oyj 23352 4,935,777€             4,290,223€             3,653,373€             3,529,957€             2,454,227€             18,863,557€          
Kone Oyj 22783.11 5,138,675€             4,895,379€             5,475,548€             4,764,209€             3,440,163€             23,713,974€          
Telia Company AB 16341.74 2,426,526€             2,112,310€             2,049,585€             2,846,376€             2,340,628€             11,775,424€          
Fortum Oyj 13458.76 1,368,000€             2,572,000€             1,867,000€             1,855,000€             1,260,483€             8,922,483€             
UPM-Kymmene Oyj 12756.28 5,065,000€             2,759,000€             1,706,000€             1,638,000€             1,603,000€             12,771,000€          
Neste Oyj 8661.32 2,540,361€             2,447,137€             2,343,926€             1,618,218€             861,810€                9,811,452€             
Wärtsilä Oyj Abp 8520.82 1,176,000€             2,447,000€             1,092,000€             1,098,000€             1,113,000€             6,926,000€             
Stora Enso Oyj 8501.66 2,218,000€             2,158,000€             2,899,000€             1,747,000€             2,199,000€             11,221,000€          
Orion Oyj 6050.48 1,978,463€             1,903,171€             1,365,906€             1,357,582€             1,040,065€             7,645,187€             
Elisa Oyj 5294.48 1,855,036€             1,549,925€             618,982€                688,633€                1,227,796€             5,940,372€             
Nokian Renkaat Oyj 4782.73 2,109,397€             787,942€                885,417€                824,717€                1,012,791€             5,620,264€             
Kesko Oyj 4626.01 1,316,760€             1,018,525€             1,496,565€             1,196,323€             1,196,323€             6,224,496€             
Metso Oyj 4199.23 743,861€                1,245,166€             799,516€                1,063,113€             1,070,761€             4,922,417€             
Huhtamäki Oyj 3686.48 2,278,727€             1,758,040€             852,461€                3,213,900€             595,785€                8,698,913€             
Outokumpu Oyj 3435.09 3,578,465€             1,049,475€             872,079€                912,540€                972,692€                7,385,251€             
SSAB 3193.37 1,985,660€             1,446,540€             1,165,557€             1,186,370€             1,196,777€             6,980,904€             
Amer Sports Oyj 2993.75 2,199,532€             1,987,351€             1,672,990€             1,137,108€             1,337,616€             8,334,597€             
Cargotec Oyj 2848.45 1,689,549€             970,237€                1,400,000€             568,750€                916,145€                5,544,681€             
TOT 56,182,960€          46,225,925€          66,996,853€          43,710,187€          32,492,441€          245,608,366€        
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Executive Compensation: Total CEO Compensation for the 20 U.S. Companies 2012-2016 (in euros). 
 
 
 
Company
Market Cap, 
Million $
2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 Tot
Prudential Financial Inc 484200 21,537,738€           14,690,666€            33,026,206€            14,750,683€         27,044,060€                  111,049,352€                
Fidelity National Information Services Inc 28544 17,633,724€           11,406,471€            11,785,126€            10,434,584€         7,156,617€                    58,416,522€                  
Hewlett Packard 27770 31,335,611€           15,098,063€            17,280,201€            15,545,393€         13,535,523€                  92,794,791€                  
Delphi Automotive 24800 11,755,000€           10,742,343€            5,792,106€              5,916,031€           4,580,250€                    38,785,730€                  
WEC Energy Group Inc 19950 10,131,659€           5,973,511€              5,731,488€              4,040,210€           4,726,067€                    30,602,935€                  
Mettler-Toledo International Inc 15640 6,454,934€             5,840,626€              4,204,947€              4,548,641€           3,898,403€                    24,947,552€                  
HCP Inc 15090 9,857,980€             6,058,692€              10,963,411€            7,396,187€           10,020,880€                  44,297,150€                  
Xylem Inc 6680 6,502,017€             6,124,517€              7,246,989€              5,543,495€           5,266,186€                    30,683,203€                  
Pinnacle West Capital Corp 9620 10,005,044€           8,224,398€              8,216,212€              7,173,792€           10,094,107€                  43,713,554€                  
Marathon Oil Corp 9530 7,592,453€             9,932,480€              10,127,333€            9,484,218€           17,324,611€                  54,461,095€                  
Apartment Investment & Management Co 6810 5,283,822€             7,872,263€              3,773,665€              4,422,539€           4,097,864€                    25,450,153€                  
Assurant Inc 5840 6,870,683€             7,290,387€              2,606,156€              2,660,458€           2,405,550€                    21,833,234€                  
Michael Kors Holdings Ltd 5360 13,273,142€           13,284,500€            11,942,767€            6,662,391€           12,081,992€                  57,244,791€                  
Newfield Exploration Co 5170 8,672,673€             7,696,044€              5,891,191€              4,779,470€           4,668,441€                    31,707,819€                  
FLIR Systems, Inc 4610 5,053,746€             7,232,084€              4,065,713€              2,784,602€           1,941,560€                    21,077,704€                  
Chesapeake Energy Corp 4420 9,781,381€             8,933,261€               €               9,345,430 5,536,336€           5,769,809€                    39,366,217€                  
AutoNation Inc 4290 9,428,644€             8,611,109€              9,008,415€              5,336,684€           5,561,738€                    37,946,589€                  
Proofpoint Inc 3760 4,484,781€             6,951,702€              5,156,350€              1,903,805€           981,456€                        19,478,095€                  
Tribune Media 3600 6,743,580€             7,072,191€              20,180,962€            7,681,370€           proxy not found 41,678,104€                  
Dana Inc 3470 8,248,856€             4,644,984€              7,521,173€              7,656,979€           7,508,290€                    35,580,281€                  
Total 210,647,466€         173,680,291€          193,865,841€          134,257,869€      148,663,405€                861,114,872€                
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Executive Compensation: Executive Compensation Components, 20 
Finnish Companies 
 
 
 
 
Base Salary 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012
Nordea 1,292,312.00€   1,259,252€         1,241,653€         1,274,970€         1,236,970€         
Nokia 1,049,044€         1,000,000€         1,270,754€         1,105,171.00€   1,079,500€         
Sampo Oyj 1,108,336€         856,961.00€       851,144€             902,961€             856,887€             
Kone Oyj 750,000€             750,000€             922,500€             722,200€             722,200€             
Telia Company AB 1,635,704€         1,500,656€         1,449,909€         569,240€             1,083,213€         
Fortum Oyj 982,000€             956,000€             1,005,000€         795,000€             979824
UPM-Kymmene Oyj 1,049,000€         1,052,000€         1,052,000€         1,059,000€         1,059,000€         
Neste Oyj 685,702€             667,623€             666,867€             700,067€             718,159€             
Wärtsilä Oyj Abp 781,000€             878,000€             662,000€             660,000€             614,000€             
Stora Enso Oyj 934,000€             932,000€             1,039,000€         1,148,000€         1,119,000€         
Orion Oyj 468,720€             462,658€             452,622€             448,777€             441,149€             
Elisa Oyj 546,781€             536,640€             19,130€               513,300€             531,143€             
Nokian Renkaat Oyj 753,435€             687,942€             736,419€             659,388€             625,719€             
Kesko Oyj 873,600€             856,800€             1,108,560€         898,560€             865,300€             
Metso Oyj 610,136€             616,200€             553,200€             551,820€             551,820€             
Huhtamäki Oyj 698,788€             673,963€             649,670€             625,955€             595,785€             
Outokumpu Oyj 1,137,213€         634,888€             749,040€             755,040€             882,692€             
SSAB 961,804€             967,829€             801,321€             832,541€             728,473€             
Amer Sports Oyj 677,541€             682,397€             642,332€             641,113€             1,137,108€         
Cargotec Oyj 686,168.00€       625,088.00€       1,400,000€         568,750€             535,200€             
TOT 17,683,300€       16,598,911€       17,275,134€       15,433,866€       16,365,154€       
AVERAGE 884,064€             829,845€             863,656€             771,593€             818,157€             
MEDIAN 827,300€             803,400€             826,232€             711,134€             792,680€             
STI 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012
Nordea 749,204.00€       1,182,649€         1,084,267€         831,280€             
Nokia 780,357.00€       1,922,125€         1,778,105€         769,217.00€       
Sampo Oyj 565,441€             472,262.00€       498,229€             288,996€             204,340€             
Kone Oyj 600,000€             675,000€             1,334,950€         758,700€             686,480€             
Telia Company AB 140,641€             15,224€               21,356€               580,076€             316,051€             
Fortum Oyj 30,000€               36,000€               127,000€             22,000€               280659
UPM-Kymmene Oyj 888,000€             856,000€             627,000€             553,000€             508,000€             
Neste Oyj 260,337€             221,501€             228,962€             143,651€             143,651€             
Wärtsilä Oyj Abp 179,000€             369,000€             430,000€             300,000€             75,000€               
Stora Enso Oyj 499,000€             232,000€             847,000€             186,000€             411,000€             
Orion Oyj 614,189€             600,910€             554,765€             509,917€             407,214€             
Elisa Oyj 360,392€             280,470€             84,461€               175,333€             199,066€             
Nokian Renkaat Oyj 560,219€             100,000€             104,998€             165,329€             387,072€             
Kesko Oyj 420,000€             140,000€             360,000€             360,000€             309,000€             
Metso Oyj 133,725€             159,423€             64,400€               229,263€             218,452€             
Huhtamäki Oyj 499,125€             271,373€             121,070€             397,098€             
Outokumpu Oyj 303,912€             123,039€             157,500€             90,000€               
SSAB 579,151€             41,627€               166,508€             
Amer Sports Oyj 593,648€             315,575€             584,953€             241,440€             
Cargotec Oyj 559,707.00€       345,149.00€       380,945€             
TOT 9,012,136€         8,540,200€         8,974,555€         6,668,800€         4,783,438€         
AVERAGE 474,323€             427,010€             498,586€             370,489€             298,965€             
MEDIAN 559,707.00€       292,191.00€       395,000.00€       294,498.00€       294,829.50€       
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LTI 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012
Nordea 450,546.00€       
Nokia 7,556,598€         3,335,352€         3,759,936€         7,583,351€         3,128,750€         
Sampo Oyj 3,262,000€         2,961,000€         2,304,000€         2,338,000€         1,393,000€         
Kone Oyj 3,527,900€         3,213,501€         3,218,098€         3,283,309€         2,031,483€         
Telia Company AB not available not available not available not available not available 
Fortum Oyj 1,299,000€         235,000€             448,000€             
UPM-Kymmene Oyj 3,098,000€         824,000€             
Neste Oyj 630,226€             716,954€             803,897€             249,357€             
Wärtsilä Oyj Abp 216,000€             1,200,000€         -€                      138,000€             424,000€             
Stora Enso Oyj 151,000€             371,000€             549,000€             -€                      239,000€             
Orion Oyj 466,239€             433,758€             358,519€             398,888€             191,702€             
Elisa Oyj 947,863€             732,815€             497,587€             
Nokian Renkaat Oyj 795,743€             
Kesko Oyj
Metso Oyj 469,543€             181,916€             282,030€             300,489€             
Huhtamäki Oyj 1,080,814€         812,704€             81,721€               2,190,847€         
Outokumpu Oyj 2,441,252€         110,675€             
SSAB
Amer Sports Oyj 497,543€             458,649€             254,555€             
Cargotec Oyj 443,674€             
TOT 25,114,852€       16,938,951€       11,492,087€       17,166,337€       8,656,557€         
AVERAGE 1,793,918.00€   1,209,925.07€   1,149,208.70€   1,560,576.09€   961,839.67€       
MEDIAN 871,803€             772,760€             453,760€             398,888€             450,546€             
Pensions and Benefits 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012
Nordea 29,499€               80,278€               73,026€               81,645€               440,915€             
Nokia 122,157€             145,658€             25,573,207€       818,757€             316,698€             
Sampo Oyj
Kone Oyj 260,775€             256,878€             
Telia Company AB 650,181€             596,430€             578,320€             748,268€             941,364€             
Fortum Oyj 356,000€             281,000€             500,000€             590,000€             
UPM-Kymmene Oyj 30,000€               27,000€               27,000€               26,000€               36,000€               
Neste Oyj 964,096€             841,059€             644,200€             525,143€             
Wärtsilä Oyj Abp
Stora Enso Oyj 634,000€             623,000€             464,000€             413,000€             430,000€             
Orion Oyj 429,315€             405,845€             
Elisa Oyj
Nokian Renkaat Oyj 44,000€               
Kesko Oyj 23,160€               21,725€               28,005€               22,740€               22,023€               
Metso Oyj
Huhtamäki Oyj
Outokumpu Oyj 187,213€             
SSAB 444,705€             437,084€             364,236€             353,830€             301,797€             
Amer Sports Oyj
Cargotec Oyj
TOT 4,131,101€         3,715,957€         28,295,994€       3,579,383€         2,488,797€         
AVERAGE 344,258€             337,814€             2,829,599€         397,709€             355,542€             
MEDIAN 308,388€             281,000€             414,118€             413,000€             316,698€             
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Executive Compensation: Executive Compensation Components, 20 
U.S. Companies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Base Salary 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012
Prudential Financial Inc 1,400,000$              1,400,000$                1,400,000$                 1,400,000$                1,400,000$             
Fidelity National Information Services Inc 1,000,000$              1,000,000$                850,000$                     1,000,000$                1,000,000$             
Hewlett Packard 1,500,058$              1,500,058$                1,500,058$                 1$                                1$                              
Delphi Automotive 1,175,000$              1,066,667$                825,000$                     1,248,142$                1,211,100$             
WEC Energy Group Inc 941,667$                 799,155$                    774,000$                     1,243,256$                1,209,393$             
Mettler-Toledo International Inc 1,812,750$              917,715$                    965,176$                     965,176$                   965,176$                 
HCP Inc 1,934,850$              800,000$                    800,000$                     196,970$                   850,000$                 
Xylem Inc 975,384$                 981,731$                    711,538$                     966,731$                   935,000$                 
Pinnacle West Capital Corp 1,277,000$              1,277,000$                1,240,000$                 1,203,000$                1,146,000$             
Marathon Oil Corp 1,050,000$              1,050,000$                1,036,346$                 392,307$                   1,250,000$             
Apartment Investment & Management Co 600,000$                 600,000$                    600,000$                     600,000$                   600,000$                 
Assurant Inc 955,000$                 850,000$                    598,750$                     1,000,000$                975,000$                 
Michael Kors Holdings Ltd 1,000,000$              2,500,000$                2,500,000$                 2,500,000$                2,500,000$             
Newfield Exploration Co 850,000$                 850,000$                    850,000$                     842,308$                   788,463$                 
FLIR Systems, Inc 835,731$                 831,731$                    726,692$                     538,462$                   870,192$                 
AutoNation Inc 1,250,000$              1,250,000$                1,250,000$                 1,150,000$                1,150,000$             
Chesapeake Energy Corp 1,300,000$              1,348,462$                1,250,000$                 1,622,634$                1,835,000$             
Proofpoint Inc 450,342$                 450,000$                    450,000$                     441,250$                   317,500$                 
Tribune Media 1,600,000$              1,600,000$                1,597,308$                 1,459,615$                
Dana Inc 1,100,000$              430,833$                    1,025,000$                 1,006,250$                950,000$                 
TOT 23,007,782$           21,503,352$              20,949,868$               19,776,102$             19,952,825$           
AVERAGE 1,150,389$              1,075,168$                1,047,493$                 988,805$                   1,050,149$             
MEDIAN 1,075,000$              990,866$                    907,588$                     1,000,000$                975,000$                 
STI 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012
Prudential Financial Inc 8,753,268.00$        9,273,192.00$          8,499,573.00$           8,499,573.00$          6,290,097.00$       
Fidelity National Information Services Inc 11,219,250.00$     1,062,919.00$          1,886,745.00$           3,729,313.00$          3,949,636.00$       
Hewlett Packard 3,081,189.00$        2,453,262.00$          4,314,000.00$           260,000.00$             1,686,915.00$       
Delphi Automotive 1,962,000.00$        1,853,000.00$          1,180,875.00$           2,790,875.00$          1,494,000.00$       
WEC Energy Group Inc 2,162,593.00$        1,680,500.00$          1,598,927.00$           3,097,587.00$          2,951,811.00$       
Mettler-Toledo International Inc 665,802.00$              978,592.00$               452,185.00$             485,001.00$           
HCP Inc 1,385,280.00$          2,400,000.00$           2,200,000.00$          2,000,000.00$       
Xylem Inc 1,005,480.00$        843,960.00$              1,004,180.00$           330,000.00$             872,990.00$           
Pinnacle West Capital Corp 2,066,186.00$        2,066,186.00$          1,852,560.00$           2,009,011.00$          1,795,782.00$       
Marathon Oil Corp 1,312,500.00$        1,681,250.00$          2,206,250.00$           3,875,000.00$          3,250,000.00$       
Apartment Investment & Management Co 1,469,640.00$        1,566,600.00$          1,339,485.00$           1,094,835.00$          1,217,685.00$       
Assurant Inc 1,130,720.00$        2,080,800.00$          586,775.00$               2,480,000.00$          4,040,400.00$       
Michael Kors Holdings Ltd 6,500,000.00$        5,000,000.00$          5,000,000.00$           5,000,000.00$          5,000,000.00$       
Newfield Exploration Co 1,785,000.00$        1,800,000.00$          2,050,000.00$           600,000.00$             1,080,000.00$       
FLIR Systems, Inc 440,800.00$           796,509.00$              706,115.00$               212,151.00$             
AutoNation Inc 2,024,250.00$        1,699,313.00$          2,082,375.00$           3,323,093.00$          3,163,567.00$       
Chesapeake Energy Corp 2,589,571.00$        2,691,000.00$          2,720,625.00$           3,619,260.00$          3,179,625.00$       
Proofpoint Inc 496,575.00$               344,442.00$             240,779.00$           
Tribune Media 1,275,000.00$        1,500,000.00$          1,500,000.00$           3,250,000.00$          
Dana Inc 1,722,100.00$        1,112,000.00$          2,974,151.00$           3,230,316.00$          2,080,000.00$       
TOT 50,499,547.00$     41,211,573.00$        45,377,803.00$         50,397,641.00$       44,778,288.00$     
AVERAGE 2,970,561.59$        2,169,030.16$          2,268,890.15$           2,519,882.05$          2,487,682.67$       
MEDIAN 1,962,000.00$        1,681,250.00$          1,869,652.50$           2,635,437.50$          2,040,000.00$       
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LTI 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012
Prudential Financial Inc 6,429,288.00$        6,473,625.00$          6,751,340.00$           6,751,340.00$          7,324,525.00$       
Fidelity National Information Services Inc 7,499,967.00$        10,523,958.00$        10,285,028.00$         9,000,014.00$          7,498,963.00$       
Hewlett Packard 30,699,583.00$     12,884,785.00$        13,502,712.00$         17,107,908.00$       13,454,325.00$     
Delphi Automotive 7,044,063.00$        9,112,214.00$          3,938,805.00$           7,685,494.00$          9,190,800.00$       
WEC Energy Group Inc 3,708,395.00$        3,244,717.00$          2,430,768.00$           5,171,466.00$          4,754,312.00$       
Mettler-Toledo International Inc 1,199,870.00$        3,575,041.00$          3,371,905.00$           3,122,153.00$          2,799,930.00$       
HCP Inc 3,634,580.00$        4,682,856.00$          9,214,476.00$           6,000,010.00$          8,937,433.00$       
Xylem Inc 5,262,541.00$        4,999,981.00$          6,133,242.00$           4,500,018.00$          4,249,996.00$       
Pinnacle West Capital Corp 4,400,029.00$        4,400,029.00$          4,199,976.00$           4,000,235.00$          7,100,295.00$       
Marathon Oil Corp 5,803,110.00$        8,054,680.00$          7,768,139.00$           6,423,201.00$          7,567,552.00$       
Apartment Investment & Management Co 3,925,697.00$        6,767,312.00$          2,342,345.00$           3,326,295.00$          2,834,825.00$       
Assurant Inc 4,696,423.00$        3,822,671.00$          1,270,097.00$           3,250,333.00$          3,167,569.00$       
Michael Kors Holdings Ltd 7,488,958.00$        7,499,939.00$          5,983,642.00$           6,666,909.00$       
Newfield Exploration Co 7,165,038.00$        6,038,119.00$          3,734,242.00$           3,942,797.00$          3,126,708.00$       
FLIR Systems, Inc 3,825,596.00$        4,080,036.00$          2,573,680.00$           2,718,655.00$          3,770,510.00$       
AutoNation Inc 7,717,160.00$        7,074,586.00$          7,110,567.00$           3,323,093.00$          3,163,567.00$       
Chesapeake Energy Corp 10,750,000.00$     10,750,030.00$        10,500,024.00$         41,072,763.00$       23,241,310.00$     
Proofpoint Inc 4,639,660.00$        7,439,419.00$          4,905,324.00$           1,374,732.00$          555,325.00$           
Tribune Media 4,803,093.00$        4,952,759.00$          19,901,616.00$         5,406,477.00$          
Dana Inc 6,230,479.00$        3,647,879.00$          4,414,982.00$           2,752,311.00$          2,622,580.00$       
TOT 136,923,530.00$   130,024,636.00$      130,332,910.00$       136,929,295.00$     122,027,434.00$  
AVERAGE 6,846,176.50$        6,501,231.80$          6,516,645.50$           7,206,805.00$          6,422,496.53$       
MEDIAN 5,532,826€             6,255,872€                5,444,483€                 4,500,018€               4,754,312€            
Pensions and Benefits 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012
Prudential Financial Inc 90,615.00$              20,336,275.00$        90,374.00$                 90,464.00$                15,679,033.00$     
Fidelity National Information Services Inc 291,160.00$           366,625.00$              356,948.00$               414,754.00$             213,495.00$           
Hewlett Packard 283,521.00$           297,441.00$              295,394.00$               275,334.00$             220,901.00$           
Delphi Automotive 185,729.00$           164,438.00$              131,387.00$               293,538.00$             1,445,373.00$       
WEC Energy Group Inc 4,690,324.00$        1,057,653.00$          1,703,550.00$           258,517.00$             4,162,462.00$       
Mettler-Toledo International Inc 4,315,980.00$        1,515,228.00$          -385,585.00 $             503,718.00$             175,945.00$           
HCP Inc 603,940.00$           10,600.00$                32,832.00$                 281.00$                      11,250.00$             
Xylem Inc 138,660.00$           127,798.00$              378,909.00$               730,216.00$             142,473.00$           
Pinnacle West Capital Corp 1,594,355.00$        1,594,355.00$          2,035,740.00$           1,047,236.00$          1,418,267.00$       
Marathon Oil Corp 454,479.00$           490,911.00$              487,332.00$               77,399.00$                8,330,616.00$       
Apartment Investment & Management Co 3,650.00$                3,835.00$                   2,600.00$                    
Assurant Inc 1,015,738.00$        1,520,754.00$          502,235.00$               359,259.00$             660,769.00$           
Michael Kors Holdings Ltd 80,703.00$              82,618.00$                65,578.00$                 64,145.00$                58,547.00$             
Newfield Exploration Co 88,110.00$              86,526.00$                82,599.00$                 64,208.00$                78,060.00$             
FLIR Systems, Inc 635,643.00$           2,502,670.00$          609,520.00$               703,516.00$             34,411.00$             
AutoNation Inc 114,905.00$              163,654.00$               164,951.00$             179,752.00$           
Chesapeake Energy Corp 643,792.00$           628,523.00$              206,728.00$               12,585,388.00$       1,184,294.00$       
Proofpoint Inc 342.00$                    345.00$                      300.00$                       300.00$                      300.00$                   
Tribune Media 10,600.00$              10,600.00$                10,400.00$                 141,822.00$             
Dana Inc 312,760.00$           82,970.00$                441,370.00$               2,026,525.00$          3,187,754.00$       
TOT 15,440,101.00$     30,995,070.00$        7,211,865.00$           19,801,571.00$       37,183,702.00$     
AVERAGE 812,636.89$           1,549,753.50$          360,593.25$               1,042,187.95$          2,065,761.22$       
MEDIAN 291,160.00$           230,939.50$              185,191.00$               275,334.00$             217,198.00$           
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Stock Options and Shareholdings: Stock Options Exercised, U.S. Companies 2012-2016 
 
Company
Market Cap, 
Million $
2016 2015 2014 2013 2012
Prudential Financial Inc 484200 9,597,799.68€        550,510.19€          2,273,824.02€          8,775,481.92€         
Fidelity National Information Services Inc 28544 15,683,971.86€      17,560,675.70€        20,267,994.31€       
Hewlett Packard 27770
Delphi Automotive 24800
WEC Energy Group Inc 19950 6,184,874.27€        8,975,972€            9,427,819€                2,067,816.77€         2185201.15
Mettler-Toledo International Inc 15640 16,060,314.31€      26640395.36 16,235,139.00€        16,452,461.44€       5,060,376.08€       
HCP Inc 15090 32,622,638.52€    
Xylem Inc 6680
Pinnacle West Capital Corp 9620
Marathon Oil Corp 9530 9,653,110.93€       
Apartment Investment & Management Co 6810 9,238,823.98€        4,600,851.87€      8,387,144.04€          7,670,893.65€       
Assurant Inc 5840 2,628,173.84€         1,284,425.92€       
Michael Kors Holdings Ltd 5360 32,180,296.50€       no proxy filing
Newfield Exploration Co 5170
FLIR Systems, Inc 4610 1,296,069.71$         2,415,548.33€          
AutoNation Inc 4420 3,116,351.95€          4,726,628.60€         9,013,282.14€       
Chesapeake Energy Corp 4290
Proofpoint Inc 3760 10,771,763.56€      11,550,239.81€    2,020,501.65€          ? ?
Tribune Media 3600
Dana Inc 3470
Total 68,833,617.37€      52,317,968.98€    61,437,004.16€        87,098,853.38€       67,489,928.39€    
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Stock Options and Shareholdings: Shares Acquired on Vesting, RSU and PSU, 20 U.S. Companies 2012-2016. 
  
 
Company
Market Cap, 
Million $
2016 2015 2014 2013 2012
Prudential Financial Inc 484200 2,449,448.19€      6,259,011.89€      4,855,768.41€       4,050,044.81€     8,996,987.72€            
Fidelity National Information Services Inc 28544 3,849,808.62€      5,411,461.48€      5,702,155.39€       4,663,310.90€     2,475,872.70€            
Hewlett Packard 27770 4,759,980.99€      12,897,502.76€    10,779,212.91€    696,786.95€        73,812.00€                  
Delphi Automotive 24800 6,770,470.32€      9,161,612.54€      7,173,110.89€       408,661.65€        4,762,316.00€            
WEC Energy Group Inc 19950 1,942,336.02€      2,062,221.58€      2,197,840.43€       2,607,642.98€     2,672,616.09€            
Mettler-Toledo International Inc 15640
HCP Inc 15090 160,497.31€          3,026,982.20€      2,893,255.37€       510,459.03€        15,364,450.24€         
Xylem Inc 6680 755,194.68€          81,198.54€           516,590.24€               
Pinnacle West Capital Corp 9620 12048212.71 6,304,666.91€      4538604.5 4,870,009.11€     2,967,293.66€            
Marathon Oil Corp 9530 1,177,515.18€      135,355.56€          308,205.64€          
Apartment Investment & Management Co 6810 3,021,959.18€      3,618,553.73€      2,776,662.55€       2,054,099.41€     1,194,453.88€            
Assurant Inc 5840 1,842,078.76€      1,304,935.28€      1,569,789.66€       3,059,279.89€     3,444,026.73€            
Michael Kors Holdings Ltd 5360 2,082,456.48€      3,467,774.63€      2,946,893.57€       1,788,201.36€     no proxy filing
Newfield Exploration Co 5170 8,991,198.25€      3,940,531.79€      2,501,380.12€       1,555,696.30€     2,020,604.89€            
FLIR Systems, Inc 4610 1,219,550.03€      960,264.16€          740,151.44€          200,880.19€        200,880.19€               
AutoNation Inc 4420
Chesapeake Energy Corp 4290 1,527,821.92€      1,202,440.11€       11,389,991.15€         
Proofpoint Inc 3760 1,496,042.18€      645,300.07€          
Tribune Media 3600 2,778,940.89€      2,220,713.31€      2,533,389.59€       
Dana Inc 3470 1,290,592.41€      1,537,554.77€       2,059,182.65€     1,872,229.76€            
Total 56,636,282.20€    62,944,709.81€    54,256,415.35€    28,605,453.77€  57,952,125.25€         
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Stock Options and Shareholdings: CEO Shareholdings Market Value Portfolio, 20 Finnish Companies 2012-2016. 
 
TOT Value Shares Market Cap, Million € 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012
Nordea 43698.98 2,526,060€          2,248,231€          1,812,040€          1,499,020€          1,171,981€          
Nokia 25141.72 6,886,506€          196,165€              194,976€              
Sampo Oyj 23352 11,691,040€        11,834,365€        11,090,602€        9,598,357€          6,282,349€          
Kone Oyj 22783.11 10,234,043€        6,070,281€          3,390,034€          2,456,455€          825,562€              
Telia Company AB 16341.74 591,735€              577,080€              533,000€              515,140€              308,400€              
Fortum Oyj 13458.76 795,938€              935,438€              272,910€              489,316€              250,181€              
UPM-Kymmene Oyj 12756.28 7,096,854€          3,795,338€          2,659,714€          2,398,210€          1,720,540€          
Neste Oyj 8661.32 1,852,631€          1,459,963€          881,412€              369,834€              205,020€              
Wärtsilä Oyj Abp 8520.82 274,006€              139,938€              222,540€              214,620€              196,320€              
Stora Enso Oyj 8501.66 937,217€              701,392€              2,525,270€          1,732,536€          1,350,951€          
Orion Oyj 6050.48 3,489,729€          2,158,582€          1,353,415€          755,803€              992,555€              
Elisa Oyj 5294.48 1,924,662€          1,082,352€          1,439,319€          
Nokian Renkaat Oyj 4782.73 916,740€              162190
Kesko Oyj 4626.01 949,837€              284564.67 887050.56 895146.8 489537.38
Metso Oyj 4199.23 838,935€              640,810€              575,882€              636,127€              527,539€              
Huhtamäki Oyj 3686.48 3,383,352€          2,680,000€          2,184,000€          3,840,035€          1,041,108€          
Outokumpu Oyj 3435.09 4,967,219€          190800 712000 1388000
SSAB 3193.37 105,128€              37,012€                72,934€                74,456€                86,920€                
Amer Sports Oyj 2993.75 4,835,280€          4,613,731€          2,406,511€          1,725,721€          1,033,425€          
Cargotec Oyj 2848.45 1,879,311€          694,244€              310,270€              
TOT Value Shares 66,178,237€        40,313,691€        31,255,105€        29,664,379€        17,872,400€        
Year 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012
AVERAGE 6,302,593€          4,031,268€          3,472,678€          3,122,460€          2,102,517€          
MEDIAN 1,901,986€          935,438€              887,051€              825,475€              909,059€              
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Dividends: Dividends Paid for the 20 Finnish Companies, 2012-2016.  
 
Company
Market Cap, Million 
€
2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 Tot Dividends
Nordea Bank AB 43698.98 2,584,000,000€    2,501,100,294€  1,733,603,282€  1,370,000,000€  1,048,000,000€  9,236,703,576€         
Nokia Oyj 25141.72 1,515,000,000€    512,000,000€     511,000,000€     - 742,000,000€     3,280,000,000€         
Sampo Oyj 23352 1,288,000,000€    1,204,000,000€  1,092,000,000€  924,000,000€     756,000,000€     5,264,000,000€         
Kone Oyj 22783.11 718,241,556€        616,281,314€     512,492,200€     448,327,095€     741,008,828€     3,036,350,993€         
Telia Company AB 16341.74 890,923,446€        1,336,385,169€  1,336,385,169€  1,336,385,169€  1,269,617,350€  6,169,696,303€         
Fortum Oyj 13458.76 977,000,000€        1,155,000,000€  977,203,750€     888,000,000€     888,000,000€     4,885,203,750€         
UPM-Kymmene Oyj 12756.28 400,000,000€        373,000,000€     319,000,000€     317,000,000€     315,000,000€     1,724,000,000€         
Neste Oyj 8661.32 256,000,000€        166,000,000€     167,000,000€     97,000,000.00€  90,000,000.00€  776,000,000€             
Wärtsilä Oyj Abp 8520.82 250,000,000€        237,000,000€     227,000,000€     207,000,000€     197,000,000€     1,118,000,000€         
Stora Enso Oyj 8501.66 260,000,000€        237,000,000€     237,000,000€     237,000,000€     237,000,000€     1,208,000,000€         
Orion Oyj 6050.48 183,600,000€        183,300,000€     176,100,000€     183,400,000€     183,200,000€     909,600,000€             
Elisa Oyj 5294.48 223,200,000€        210,300,000€     206,700,000€     204,200,000€     203,500,000€     1,047,900,000€         
Nokian Renkaat Oyj 4782.73 202,000,000€        193,500,000€     193,400,000€     191,900,000€     156,600,000€     937,400,000€             
Kesko Oyj 4626.01 248,194,233€        148,715,547€     138,484,759€     122,400,000€     123,000,000€     780,794,539€             
Metso Oyj 4199.23 157,000,000€        217,000,000€     150,000,000€     254,000,000€     277,000,000€     1,055,000,000€         
Huhtamäki Oyj 3686.48 68,500,000€          62,200,000€        59,000,000€        57,700,000€        46,700,000€        294,100,000€             
Outokumpu Oyj 3435.09 - - - - - -€                              
SSAB 3193.37 no div proposed no div proposed - 33,975,099€        67,950,199€        101,925,298€             
Amer Sports Oyj 2993.75 64,700,000€          52,800,000€        47,200,000€        41,300,000€        38,900,000€        244,900,000€             
Cargotec Oyj 2848.45 52,200,000€          36,100,000€        27,600,000€        44,300,000€        61,400,000€        221,600,000€             
Tot 10,338,559,235€  9,441,682,324€  8,111,169,160€  6,957,887,363€  7,441,876,377€  42,291,174,459€       
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Dividends: Net Profits for the 20 Finnish Companies 2012-2016. 
 
Company
Market Cap, 
Million €
2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 Tot
Nordea Bank AB 43698.98 3,766,000,000€    3,662,000,000€    3,320,000,000€    3,116,000,000€     3,126,000,000€     16,990,000,000€          
Nokia Oyj 25141.72 927,000,000-€        246,800,000€        3,476,000,000€    739,000,000-€        3,786,000,000-€     1,729,200,000-€             
Sampo Oyj 23352 1,650,000,000€    1,656,000,000€    1,540,000,000€    1,452,000,000€     1,410,000,000€     7,708,000,000€             
Kone Oyj 22783.11 1,023,000,000€    1,053,000,000€    774,000,000€        713,000,000€        611,000,000€        4,174,000,000€             
Telia Company AB 16341.74 383,940,682€        879,709,745€        1,491,936,700€    1,540,083,601€     2,045,831,830€     6,341,502,557€             
Fortum Oyj 13458.76 504,000,000€        4,245,000,000€    3,428,000,000€    1,200,000,000€     1,420,000,000€     10,797,000,000€          
UPM-Kymmene Oyj 12756.28 880,000,000€        916,000,000€        512,000,000€        335,000,000€        1,122,000,000-€     1,521,000,000€             
Neste Oyj 8661.32 938,000,000€        558,000,000€        60,000,000€          524,000,000€        157,000,000€        2,237,000,000€             
Wärtsilä Oyj Abp 8520.82 357,000,000€        451,000,000€        351,000,000€        393,000,000€        344,000,000€        1,896,000,000€             
Stora Enso Oyj 8501.66 407,000,000€        783,000,000€        90,000,000€          71,000,000-€           490,000,000€        1,699,000,000€             
Orion Oyj 6050.48 249,000,000€        208,000,000€        211,300,000€        206,200,000€        206,900,000€        1,081,400,000€             
Elisa Oyj 5294.48 257,000,000€        244,000,000€        223,000,000€        196,600,000€        208,700,000€        1,129,300,000€             
Nokian Renkaat Oyj 4782.73 251,800,000€        240,700,000€        208,400,000€        183,700,000€        330,900,000€        1,215,500,000€             
Kesko Oyj 4626.01 113,800,000€        117,400,000€        108,000,000€        184,600,000€        135,800,000€        659,600,000€                
Metso Oyj 4199.23 130,000,000€        442,000,000€        189,000,000€        295,000,000€        256,000,000€        1,312,000,000€             
Huhtamäki Oyj 3686.48 191,500,000€        151,400,000€        131,500,000€        96,200,000€           124,100,000€        694,700,000€                
Outokumpu Oyj 3435.09 144,000,000€        86,000,000€          439,000,000-€        1,103,000,000-€     540,000,000€        772,000,000-€                
SSAB 3193.37 96,396,682€          52,262,022-€          143,926,316-€        109,667,943-€        1,543,169€             207,916,430-€                
Amer Sports Oyj 2993.75 126,900,000€        121,600,000€        55,400,000€          90,300,000€           57,900,000€           452,100,000€                
Cargotec Oyj 2848.45 125,000,000€        142,900,000€        72,000,000€          55,400,000€           89,500,000€           484,800,000€                
Tot 10,667,337,364€  16,152,247,723€  15,658,610,384€  8,558,415,658€     6,647,174,999€     57,683,786,127€          
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Dividends: Dividends per Share for the 20 Finnish Companies 2012-2016.  
 
Company
Market Cap, Million 
€
2016 2015 2014 2013 2012
Nordea Bank AB 43698.98 0.64 0.62 0.43 0.34 0.26
Nokia Oyj 25141.72 0.26 0.14 0.37 0.2
Sampo Oyj 23352 2.3 2.15 1.95 1.65 1.35
Kone Oyj B Shares 22783.11 1.55 1.4 1.2 1 1.525
Telia Company AB 16341.74 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.29 0.29
Fortum Oyj 13458.76 1.1 1.1 1.3 1.1 1
UPM-Kymmene Oyj 12756.28 0.95 0.75 0.7 0.6 0.6
Neste Oyj 8661.32 1.3 1 0.65 0.65 0.38
Wärtsilä Oyj Abp 8520.82 1.20 1.15 1.05 1.00 0.90
Stora Enso Oyj 8501.66 0.37 0.33 0.3 0.3 0.3
Orion Oyj 6050.48 1.55 1.3 1.3 1.25 1.3
Elisa Oyj 5294.48 1.5 1.4 1.32 1.3 1.3
Nokian Renkaat Oyj 4782.73 1.53 1.45 1.45 1.45 1.2
Kesko Oyj 4626.01 2.5 1.5 1.4 1.2 1.2
Metso Oyj 4199.23 1.05 1.45 1 1.85 2.2
Huhtamäki Oyj 3686.48 0.73 0.66 0.6 0.57 0.56
Outokumpu Oyj 3435.09
SSAB 3193.37 0.73 1.46
Amer Sports Oyj 2993.75 0.62 0.55 0.45 0.4 0.35
Cargotec Oyj B Shares 2848.45 0.95 0.8 0.55 0.42 0.72
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Dividends: Dividends Paid for the 20 U.S. Companies 2012-2016  
 
Company
Market Cap, 
Million $
2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 Total
Prudential Financial Inc 48420 USD 1,140,200,851€      1,026,180,765€      900,758,672.10€    742,884,708.15€    673,595,579.53€    4,483,620,575.55€      
Fidelity National Information Services Inc 28544 B USD 316,000,000€          267,000,000€          241,000,000€          224,000,000€          206,000,000€          1,254,000,000.00€      
Hewlett Packard 27.77B 327,000,000€          327,000,000.00€          
Delphi Automotive 23 B USD 278,000,000€          250,000,000€          264,000,000€          185,000,000€          41,222,646€            1,018,222,646.14€      
WEC Energy Group Inc 19 B USD 548,173,486€          399,070,298€          308,731,307€          288,558,523€          242,073,411€          1,786,607,025.38€      
Mettler-Toledo International Inc 15.09 B USD
HCP Inc 14.42 B USD 859,536,783€          918,301,032€          878,832,507€          839,363,981€          758,672,773€          4,254,707,075.85€      
Xylem Inc 6.68 B USD 98,232,775€            89,461,991€            82,445,364€            76,305,816€            65,780,876€            412,226,822.25€          
Pinnacle West Capital Corp 9.38 B USD 240,319,467€          228,040,371€          216,638,352€          206,113,412€          197,342,629€          1,088,454,230.75€      
Marathon Oil Corp 9.53 B USD 142,086,692€          403,456,041€          476,253,544€          445,555,801€          420,997,608€          1,888,349,686.00€      
Apartment Investment & Management Co 189,448,924€          171,030,278€          139,455,458€          125,422,204€          123,668,047€          749,024,910.90€          
Assurant Inc 5111 B Eur 109,634,794€          82,445,365€            67,535,033€            64,903,798€            60,518,406€            385,037,395.65€          
Michael Kors Holdings Ltd 5,5 B USD
Newfield Exploration Co 5.17 B USD
FLIR Systems, Inc 4610 B USD 57,887,171€            53,501,779€            49,993,466€            44,730,996€            36,837,291€            242,950,702.95€          
AutoNation Inc
Chesapeake Energy Corp 5.5 B USD 253,475,643€          355,216,732€          354,339,653€          349,077,183€          1,312,109,211.60€      
Proofpoint Inc 3.76B USD
Tribune Media 3.4B USD 78,937,052€            631,496,412€          710,433,463.50€          
Dana Inc 30,697,742€            32,451,899€            35,083,134€            50,870,544€            53,501,779€            202,605,098.85€          
Total 4,416,155,736€      4,805,911,875€      4,015,943,568€      3,648,049,437€      3,229,288,230€      20,115,348,845.37€    
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Dividends: Net Profits for the 20 U.S. Companies 2012-2016. 
 
 
Company
Market Cap, 
Million $
2016 2015 2014 2013 2012
Total Net Profits
Prudential Financial Inc 484200 3,831,074,859€          4,948,471,692€          1,211,244,135€          585,010,744-€              411,349,384€              9,817,129,325€    
Fidelity National Information Services Inc 28544 496,481,808€              552,423,420€              593,505,542€              430,925,231€              404,332,763€              2,477,668,764€    
Hewlett Packard 27770 1,102,486,515€          1,271,762,487€          1,184,931,807€          1,063,018,024€          944,612,551€              5,566,811,384€    
Delphi Automotive 24800 1,096,160,464€          1,264,465,134€          1,178,132,687€          1,056,918,443€          939,192,379€              5,534,869,107€    
WEC Energy Group Inc 19950 819,722,225€              558,108,749€              512,762,413€              503,169,919€              476,136,526€              2,869,899,832€    
Mettler-Toledo International Inc 15640 336,797,790€              309,608,385€              296,452,221€              268,385,739€              255,229,575€              1,466,473,710€    
HCP Inc 15090 547,644,210€              487,473,110-€              804,025,416€              846,755,617€              726,413,418€              2,437,365,551€    
Xylem Inc 6680 228,040,170€              298,206,376€              295,575,144€              199,973,688€              260,492,041€              1,282,287,418€    
Pinnacle West Capital Corp 9620 385,443,855€              381,083,630€              347,073,878€              354,050,238€              333,121,159€              1,800,772,760€    
Marathon Oil Corp 9530 1,866,176,129-€          1,921,987,004-€          2,656,248,826€          1,528,694,745€          1,379,575,063€          1,776,355,502€    
Apartment Investment & Management Co 6810 374,979,316€              217,139,185€              269,461,880€              180,513,298€              115,109,929€              1,157,203,609€    
Assurant Inc 5840 492,705,380€              123,830,379€              410,733,157€              426,429,966€              422,069,741€              1,875,768,623€    
Michael Kors Holdings Ltd 5360 482,240,840.76€        731,645,687.88€        768,271,574.52€        576,421,692.12€        347,073,878.16€        2,905,653,673€    
Newfield Exploration Co 5170 1,072,615,251.60-€    2,931,815,021.04-€    784,840,428.00€        128,190,603.24€        1,032,501,185.28-€    4,123,900,427-€    
FLIR Systems, Inc 4610 145,631,501.64€        211,034,870.64€        174,408,984.00€        154,351,950.84€        193,593,972.24€        879,021,279€        
Chesapeake Energy Corp 4420 375,851,360.52€        386,315,899.56€        365,386,821.48€        327,016,845.00€        275,566,194.72€        1,730,137,121€    
AutoNation Inc 4290 3,837,869,692.92-€    12,805,979,650.20-€  1,671,710,111.64€    631,360,522.08€        670,602,543.48-€        15,011,381,253-€  
Proofpoint Inc 3760 96,796,986-€                92,436,762-€                55,810,875-€                24,417,258-€                17,440,898-€                286,902,779-€        
Tribune Media 3600 12,208,629€                279,054,374-€              415,965,427€              211,034,871€              75,867,908€                436,022,460€        
Dana Inc 3470 558,108,749€              138,655,142€              278,182,329€              212,778,960€              261,613,476€              1,449,338,657€    
Total 4,412,119,612€          7,125,994,883-€          14,163,101,907€        8,490,562,350€          6,100,805,333€          26,040,594,318€  
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Dividends: Dividends per Share for the 20 U.S. Companies 2012-2016 (in USD) 
 
 
Company
Market Cap, 
Million $
2016 2015 2014 2013 2012
Prudential Financial Inc 484200 2.8 2.44 2.17 1.73 1.6
Fidelity National Information Services Inc 28544 1.04 1.04 0.96 0.88 0.8
Hewlett Packard 27770 0.49 0.67 0.61 0.55 0.5
Delphi Automotive 24800 1.16 1 1 0.68
WEC Energy Group Inc 19950 1.98 1.54 1.56 1.45 1.2
Mettler-Toledo International Inc 15640
HCP Inc 15090 2.1 2.26 2.18 2.1 2
Xylem Inc 6680 0.62 0.56 0.51 0.47 0.4
Pinnacle West Capital Corp 9620 2.53 2.41 2.3 2.2 2.12
Marathon Oil Corp 9530 0.2 0.68 0.8 0.72 0.68
Apartment Investment & Management Co 6810 1.32 1.18 1.04 0.96 0.76
Assurant Inc 5840 2.03 1.37 1.06 0.96 0.81
Michael Kors Holdings Ltd 5360
Newfield Exploration Co 5170
FLIR Systems, Inc 4610 0.48 0.44 0.4 0.36 0.28
AutoNation Inc 4420
Chesapeake Energy Corp 4290 0.17 0.35 0.35 0.35
Proofpoint Inc 3760
Tribune Media 3600 1 0.75
Dana Inc 3470 0.24 0.23 0.2 0.2 0.2
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Share Repurchases: Share Repurchases for the 20 Finnish Companies 2012-2016  
 
Company
Market Cap, 
Million €
2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 Total
Nordea Bank AB 43698.98 no share rep no share rep no share rep no share rep no share rep
Nokia Oyj 25141.72 230,610,185€          173,450,200€            426,726,459€        no share rep no share rep 830,786,844€               
Sampo Oyj 23352 no share rep no share rep no share rep no share rep no share rep
Kone Oyj 22783.11 39,255,224€            71,200,000€               32,800,000€          62,900,000€        36,900,000€          243,055,224€               
Telia Company AB 16341.74 474,255€                  102,680€                     604,900€                406,033€              no share rep 1,587,868€                    
Fortum Oyj 13458.76 no share rep no share rep no share rep no share rep no share rep
UPM-Kymmene Oyj 12756.28 no share rep no share rep no share rep no share rep no share rep
Neste Oyj 8661.32 no share rep no share rep 14,308,416€          no share rep no share rep 14,308,416€                  
Wärtsilä Oyj Abp 8520.82 no share rep no share rep no share rep no share rep no share rep
Stora Enso Oyj 8501.66 no authorization no authorization no authorization no authorization no authorization
Orion Oyj 6050.48 16,765,946€            no share rep no share rep 9,600,000€           no share rep 26,365,946€                  
Elisa Oyj 5294.48 no share rep no share rep no share rep no share rep no share rep
Nokian Renkaat Oyj 4782.73 no share rep no share rep no share rep no share rep no authorization
Kesko Oyj 4626.01 no share rep no share rep 16,060,213€          no share rep no share rep 16,060,213€                  
Metso Oyj 4199.23 no share rep 8,312,138€                 no share rep 9,540,417€           7,417,548€            25,270,103€                  
Huhtamäki Oyj 3686.48 no share rep no share rep no share rep no share rep no share rep
Outokumpu Oyj 3435.09 7,020,000€               no share rep no share rep no share rep no share rep 7,020,000€                    
SSAB 3193.37 no authorization no authorization no authorization no authorization no authorization
Amer Sports Oyj 2993.75 no share rep 1,200,000€                 13,000,000€          5,400,000€           no share rep 19,600,000€                  
Cargotec Oyj 2848.45 7,575,505€               3,349,326€                 867,737€                no share rep no share rep 11,792,568€                  
Total 301,701,115€          257,614,344€            504,367,725€        87,846,450€        44,317,548€          1,195,847,182€            
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Share Repurchases: Share Repurchases for the 20 U.S. Companies 2012-2016 (in Euros)  
 
 
Company
Market Cap, 
Million $
2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 Total
Prudential Financial Inc 484200 1,858,529,023€          1,459,458,374€          877,078,350€          647,283,822€          570,100,927€          5,412,450,496€     
Fidelity National Information Services Inc 28544 35,000,000€                no share rep 457,000,000€          417,000,000€          448,000,000€          1,357,000,000€     
Hewlett Packard 27770 2,334,000,000€          no share rep no share rep no share rep no share rep 2,334,000,000€     
Delphi Automotive 24800 556,067,184€              1,016,532,912€          898,127,439€          400,824,453€          353,462,264€          3,225,014,253€     
WEC Energy Group Inc 19950 94,724,461€                65,780,876€                107,880,637€          195,588,472€          134,192,987€          598,167,433€         
Mettler-Toledo International Inc 15640 438,538,789€              434,153,401€              363,110,117€          258,737,885€          244,704,644€          1,739,244,836€     
HCP Inc 15090 7,893,705€                   7,893,705.00€            11,402,018€            no share rep 259,615,191€          286,804,619€         
Xylem Inc 6680 3,508,313€                   156,997,025€              117,528,499€          64,026,720€            11,402,019€            353,462,575€         
Pinnacle West Capital Corp 9620 no share rep no share rep no share rep no share rep no share rep
Marathon Oil Corp 9530 no share rep no share rep 877,078,350€          438,539,175€          no share rep 1,315,617,525€     
Apartment Investment & Management Co 6810 no share rep no share rep no share rep no share rep no share rep
Assurant Inc 5840 756,918,616€              256,983,957€              188,571,845€          344,691,792€          361,356,280€          1,908,522,490€     
Michael Kors Holdings Ltd 5360 881,463,742€              1,010,394,259€          434,153,783€          1,754,157€               no share rep 2,327,765,941€     
Newfield Exploration Co 5170 no share rep no share rep 9,647,862€               5,262,470€               6,139,548€               21,049,880€           
FLIR Systems, Inc 4610 57,887,171€                107,880,637€              121,913,891€          142,086,693€          187,694,767€          617,463,158€         
AutoNation Inc 4420 437,662,097€              207,867,569€              428,014,235€          58,764,249€            505,197,130€          1,637,505,279€     
Chesapeake Energy Corp 4290 no share rep no share rep no share rep no share rep no share rep
Proofpoint Inc 3760 no share rep no share rep no share rep no share rep no share rep
Tribune Media 3600 203,482,177€              298,206,639€              52,624,701€            no share rep no share rep 554,313,517€         
Dana Inc 3470 71,043,346.35€          272,771,366.85€        228,040,371.00€    295,575,403.95€    13,156,175.25€      880,586,663€         
Total Share Repurchases 7,736,718,624€          5,294,920,720€          5,172,172,098€      3,270,135,291€      3,095,021,932€      24,568,968,666€   
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Earnings Per Share (EPS) and Return on Equity (ROE)  
 
Earnings per Share (EPS) is a financial ratio counting the net earnings against the total 
outstanding shares over a period of time. If a company has a higher ratio of EPS, this 
indicates that the company is able to generate valid returns. The common formula for 
EPS is calculated as Net Income-Preferred Dividends/Shares Outstanding. EPS is most 
valuable when utilised to compare two companies of the same industry and similar size: 
a higher EPS ratio indicates better profitability (CFI 2017). When considering basic and 
diluted EPS, diluted EPS accounts for stock options, warrants and convertibles that affect 
the shares outstanding when they are exercised.                            
 
  
 
Figure 30. Average EPS (Basic) for 2012-2016 within Six Sectors, Finland and U.S. 
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As EPS alone, or an average trend among the 20 Finnish and U.S. companies will not 
give us a good indicator in terms of profitability, we will compare it among companies 
within the same industry. Figure 30 represents average values of basic EPS comparing 
the Finnish and U.S. analysed companies.  
 
Obviously, the amount of outstanding shares influences the calculation of EPS. From 
this figure, we can evidence that some of the U.S. companies across the six sectors have 
higher EPS when compared to Finnish companies: within financials, Assurant Inc (€5.09) 
Prudential Financial (€4.22 euros) before Sampo (€2.75 euros). Within consumer goods, 
Dephi Automotive (€3.64 euros) and Michael Kors (€2.97 euros). Within utilities, Pinnacle 
West Capital (€3.17 euros). If we consider the higher practice of share repurchases in 
U.S., this might seem to have boosted some of the companies’ EPS: for instance, 
Assurant Inc’s €756 million euros share repurchases in 2016 increased 2015’s EPS of 
€1.77 to €7.84 euros, whereas Prudential Financial’s EPS had a negative -€1.32 euros 
in 2013, then increased to €10.51 euros in 2015 (€1.4 euros billion share repurchases) 
and amounted to €8.37 euros in 2016 (€1.5 billion euros share repurchases).    
 
Focusing massively on EPS means “asking for trouble” (Stewart, cited in De Wet 2014). 
While in U.S. EPS seems to be still a widely used metric to measure the financial 
performance of a firm (as we have evidenced the 20 U.S. firms having general higher 
EPS) Martin et al. (2011), reminds how Enron’s fixation with EPS (together with 
dishonest accounting practices) led to the demise of the U.S. corporation. Maboussin, 
De Wet suggests (2014), defines that a company that bases its decisions focusing 
exclusively on EPS destroys shareholder value. EPS does not account for the cost of 
equity: Penman, cited in De Vet (2014), suggests that companies can simply increase 
EPS by increasing their borrowing. Therefore, when measuring shareholder value, an 
investor/shareholder should combine EPS with Return on Equity (ROE), as another 
traditional measurement metric for shareholder value. 
   
Return on Equity (ROE) is a measure to evaluate the profitability of a company in relation 
to the book value of the shareholder equity. Calculated as Net Income/Shareholder’s 
Equity, ROE considers how a business is utilizing investments to grow. The higher the 
ROE, the better and more efficiently a company is using the capital from shareholders 
to generate profits and grow. Most importantly, ROE is a ratio of profitability from an 
investor’s point of view. A good return on equity is considered above 15 or 20%. ROE 
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ratio needs to be compared with ratios of other companies within the same sector on 
industry, to show some utility for investors and shareholders. The average ROE between 
2012-2016 has been calculated to present a comparison between companies to show 
the firms that make better use of shareholders’ capital (Figure 31). 
 
 
Figure 31. Average ROE% for 2012-2016 within Six Sectors, Finland and U.S. 
 
The figure evidences that the industries with the highest ROE were consumer goods with 
Delphi Automotive’s average of 52.9%, industrials (Kone at 39.3%) and financials 
(Apartment Investment with 22.9%, Sampo with 16.2%). Basic materials and technology 
showed some significant negative ratio from Proofpoint (-235% average), while Nokia 
performed at the lowest with 5.4%, if compared to its peer U.S. companies with positive 
ROE. The healthcare sector performed well (not included in the chart as there were only 
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two companies) with Orion and Mettler-Toledo, with respectively 40% and 48.4%. 
Overall, Finnish companies performed better within financials (average ROE 13.9% 
against 10.8%), and industrials (20.6%, albeit 13.9% was an average of the only U.S. 
company, Xylem), whereas U.S. companies showed significant higher performance on 
consumers goods with 42.1% average if compared to 14.6% of Finnish companies. Basic 
materials (-0.5% and -33.8%) and technology sectors (5.4% and -52.1%) showed the 
lowest ROE. Never the less, an investor would choose Apartment Investment and Sampo 
(financials), Delphi Automotive and Michael Kors (Consumer Goods), Kone (Industrials), 
Mettler-Toledo and/or Orion (pharmaceuticals), and Fortum (utilities) when choosing 
companies that maximise shareholder value through higher ROE. According to authors 
such as Picardo (2015), one of the benefits of share repurchases is the improvement of 
the firms’ ROE. A look into the companies’ ROE presented in the table within the same 
appendix tells us that, however, some of the companies with highest ROE (Sampo, 
Apartment Investment), did not perform any share repurchases during 2012-2016, 
whereas among consumer goods, companies such as Delphi Automotive and Michael 
Kors had higher ROE among their peers, perhaps due to share repurchases of 
respectively €3.2 billion and €2.3 billion euros. Therefore, empirical evidence (as the full 
table of ROE indicates, two pages below) did not find any significant relationship between 
share repurchases and ROE during 2012-2016 (within the thesis’ limitations), if 
compared to the relationship, within the same years, of share repurchases and EPS. 
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Earnings per Share (EPS) 2012-2016, Finnish and U.S. Companies (EPS 
for U.S. Companies in Euros) 
 
 
 
 
Industry Company 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 AVG EPS
Basic Materials UPM-Kymmene Oyj 1.65 1.72 0.96 0.63 -2.14 0.56
Basic Materials Stora Enso Oyj 0.59 1.02 0.13 -0.07 0.61 0.46
Basic Materials Outokumpu Oyj 0.35 0.23 -1.24 -0.48 -0.46 -0.32
Basic Materials SSAB 0.11 -0.07 -0.34 -0.34 0.5 -0.03
Basic Materials Marathon Oil Corp -2.22 -2.77 3.8 2.11 1.9 0.56
Basic Materials Chesapeake Energy Corp -5.48 -19.05 1.64 0.62 -1.24 -4.70
Basic Materials Newfield Exploration Co -5.4 -17.99 5.6 0.80 -7.47 -4.89
Financials Nordea Bank AB 0.93 0.91 0.83 0.77 0.78 0.84
Financials Sampo Oyj 2.95 2.96 2.75 2.59 2.51 2.75
Financials HCP Inc 1.14 -1.03 1.71 1.81 1.61 1.05
Financials Prudential Financial Inc 8.37 10.51 2.74 -1.32 0.81 4.22
Financials Apartment Investment & Management Co 2.28 1.29 1.75 1.19 0.52 1.41
Financials Assurant Inc 7.84 1.77 5.54 5.42 4.88 5.09
Consumer Goods Nokian Renkaat Oyj 1.87 1.8 1.56 1.39 2.52 1.83
Consumer Goods Amer Sports Oyj 1.08 1.04 0.47 0.77 0.48 0.77
Consumer Goods Michael Kors Holdings Ltd 2.83 3.82 3.69 2.78 1.72 2.97
Consumer Goods Delphi Automotive 3.91 4.31 3.82 3.31 2.84 3.64
Consumer Goods Dana Inc 3.72 0.85 1.67 -0.08 1.55 1.54
Health Care Orion Oyj 1.77 1.48 1.5 1.46 1.47 1.54
Health Care Mettler-Toledo International Inc 12.31 10.83 9.95 8.68 7.96 9.95
Technology Nokia Oyj -0.13 0.32 0.73 0.07 -0.16 0.17
Technology Proofpoint Inc -2.26 -2.28 -1.46 -0.67 -0.72 -1.48
Technology Hewlett Packard 1.22 2.13 2.26 2.24 -5.44 0.48
Technology FLIR Systems, Inc 1.04 1.47 1.21 1.05 1.25 1.20
Technology Fidelity National Information Services Inc 1.48 1.89 2.02 1.44 1.34 1.63
Industrials Kone Oyj 2.00 2.01 1.47 1.47 1.37 1.66
Industrials Wärtsilä Oyj Abp 1.79 2.25 1.76 1.98 1.72 1.90
Industrials Metso Oyj 0.87 2.95 1.25 1.59 1.71 1.67
Industrials Huhtamäki Oyj 1.83 1.65 1.24 1.17 1.19 1.42
Industrials Cargotec Oyj 1.95 2.21 1.11 0.89 1.45 1.52
Industrials Xylem Inc 1.23 1.6 1.56 1.04 1.36 1.36
Oil & Gas Neste Oyj 3.67 2.18 0.22 2.04 0.61 1.74
Consumer Services Kesko Oyj 0.99 1.03 0.97 1.75 1.27 1.20
Telecommunications Telia Company AB 0.39 0.21 0.35 0.36 0.47 0.36
Telecommunications Elisa Oyj 1.61 1.52 1.41 1.25 1.33 1.42
Utilities Fortum Oyj 0.56 4.66 3.55 1.3 1.5 2.31
Utilities Pinnacle West Capital Corp 3.37 3.35 3.05 3.13 2.96 3.17
Utilities WEC Energy Group Inc 2.53 2 2.22 2.16 2.01 2.18
Services Tribune Media 0.14 -2.87 4.04 2.06 0.84
Services AutoNation Inc 3.55 3.34 3.03 2.62 2.17 2.94
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Return on Equity (ROE) 2012-2016, Finnish and U.S. Companies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Industry Company 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 AVG ROE %
Basic Materials UPM-Kymmene Oyj 10.9 11.90 6.90 4.50 neg 8.6
Basic Materials Stora Enso Oyj 7.2 14.6 1.7 -1.3 8.3 6.1
Basic Materials Outokumpu Oyj 6.4 3.9 -21.8 -41.4 -21.4 -14.9
Basic Materials SSAB 2 -1 -4 -4 -1.8
Basic Materials Marathon Oil Corp -11.86 -11.14 15.09 9.32 8.93 2.1
Basic Materials Chesapeake Energy Corp -230.02 9.51 3.73 -7.21 -56.0
Basic Materials Newfield Exploration Co -106.17 -127.54 26.28 5.13 -35.34 -47.5
Financials Nordea Bank AB 11.5 12.3 11.6 11 11.6 11.6
Financials Sampo Oyj 15 14 18.1 13.8 19.9 16.2
Financials HCP Inc 8.42 -5.58 8.57 9.11 8.42 5.8
Financials Prudential Financial Inc 9.96 13.49 3.84 -1.81 1.24 5.3
Financials Apartment Investment & Management Co 26.68 18.84 30.94 23.32 14.96 22.9
Financials Assurant Inc 13.11 2.92 9.4 9.76 9.47 8.9
Nokian Renkaat Oyj Consumer Goods 18.7 19.6 16 13 25.2 18.5
Amer Sports Oyj Consumer Goods 13 13.6 6.9 12.1 7.5 10.6
Michael Kors Holdings LtdConsumer Goods 39.61 43.54 46.37 52.89 43.38 45.2
Delphi Automotive Consumer Goods 54.05 60.92 49.84 46.12 53.41 52.9
Dana Inc Consumer Goods 67.9 17.59 30.94 -1.28 25.94 28.2
Health Care Orion Oyj 40.3 37.5 41 40 41 40.0
Health Care Mettler-Toledo International Inc 75.71 54.28 40.88 34.74 36.17 48.4
Technology Nokia Oyj -5.01 25.8 45.92 -8.47 -31.16 5.4
Technology Proofpoint Inc -211.21 -182.2 -96.14 -49.62 -639.05 -235.6
Technology Hewlett Packard 20.91 16.71 18.57 20.57 -41.43 7.1
Technology FLIR Systems, Inc 10.01 14.83 12.43 11.02 13.99 12.5
Technology Fidelity National Information Services Inc 5.96 7.95 10.34 7.46 7.02 7.7
Industrials Kone Oyj 38.1 45.4 40.9 40.1 32.1 39.3
Industrials Wärtsilä Oyj Abp 18 21.4 20.1 19.8
Industrials Metso Oyj 9 33.1 15.7 19 19.8 19.3
Industrials Huhtamäki Oyj 15.8 15.8 16.1 18.1 17.7 16.7
Industrials Cargotec Oyj 9.1 11.2 5.9 4.5 7.5 7.6
Industrials Xylem Inc 12.17 16.15 15.43 10.57 15.23 13.9
Oil & Gas Neste Oyj 28.1 19.7 2.1 19.2 6.3 15.1
Consumer Services Kesko Oyj 9.8 8.2 7.6 7.7 6.9 8.0
Telecommunications Telia Company AB 4.5 9.3 15 15.9 20.5 13.0
Telecommunications Elisa Oyj 27.1 27 25.6 22.9 24.7 25.5
Utilities Fortum Oyj 3.7 33.4 30 12 14.6 18.7
Utilities Pinnacle West Capital Corp 9.77 9.29 9.94 9.79 9.7
Utilities WEC Energy Group Inc 9.74 13.55 13.7 13.39 12.6
Services Tribune Media -7.1 9.1 4.32 2.1
Services AutoNation Inc 20.02 20.26 19.99 17.66 19.5
